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ABSTRACT
Copyright grants authors exclusive rights in their works in order
to encourage creation and dissemination of socially valuable works. It
permits copyright owners to assert their copyright against violations
of those rights when necessary to protect their market exclusivity and
economic interests. Increasingly, however, copyright is being used by
individuals to achieve other objectives. This Article examines the increasingly widespread phenomenon of individuals using copyright to
vindicate noncopyright interests, which this Article refers to as
“weaponizing copyright.” In some cases, copyright is weaponized to
silence criticism and legitimate speech. In other instances, the objective is to erase facts and make information disappear. Some assertions
of copyright are intended to punish or retaliate for some perceived
wrongdoing. Other assertions of copyright involve attempts to protect
the reputation and dignity of copyright owners. Another objective is to
protect privacy in personal and intimate information. In none of these
scenarios are copyright owners seeking to protect their legitimate
market or economic interests in their copyrighted works, the intended
purpose of copyright.
Through exploring recent and high-profile instances of copyright
weaponization involving Harvey Weinstein and Ronan Farrow, Pepe
the Frog and InfoWars, Success Kid and Steve King, Navy SEALS
and the Associated Press, PewDiePie, Dr. Drew, the McCloskeys,
Netflix Films, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and others, this Article exposes
the increasingly widespread practice of copyright weaponization. It
explains how copyright became the weapon par excellence for indi* Acting Dean, Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, University of Montana Blewett
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viduals to punish, erase, suppress, protect, and vindicate noncopyright
interests, and why individuals choose to weaponize copyright instead
of pursuing claims under other laws. It reviews commonly proposed
solutions to dealing with copyright weaponization, and examines the
drawbacks of each solution. It also challenges the presumption that
weaponizing copyright is always harmful and must be discouraged by
exploring the power dynamics and blurry lines between weaponization by aggressors to punish, erase, and suppress, and weaponization
by the vulnerable to protect, preserve, and defend. Ultimately, this
Article attempts to resolve two important questions: whether copyright should serve to protect some noncopyright interests but not others, and whether there is a fair and just way to manage the
increasingly pervasive practice of copyright weaponization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright grants authors exclusive rights in their works in order
to encourage creation and dissemination of socially valuable works. It
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permits copyright owners to assert their copyright against violations
of those rights when necessary to protect their market exclusivity and
economic interests. Increasingly, however, copyright is being used by
individuals to achieve other objectives. For instance, Harvey Weinstein’s team threatened Ronan Farrow with copyright infringement to
try to stop him from publishing information about Weinstein’s sexual
misconducts. Dr. Drew filed copyright notices to take down a video
compilation featuring dismissive statements he made about COVID19. Slade Neighbors sued his ex-girlfriend for copyright infringement
for disseminating his abusive text messages and emails. Netflix asserted copyright to remove negative comments about its controversial
new film. Jehovah’s Witnesses sued Faith Leaks for copyright infringement for leaking the organization’s religious videos. Campo
Santo copyright striked PewDiePie’s Twitch channel to punish him
for yelling a racist slur in a streaming video. Police officers played
copyrighted music to complicate the ability of observers to record
police conduct and share those recordings online. Pepe the Frog creator Matt Furie targeted alt-right or racist uses of Pepe with cease and
desist letters and copyright infringement suits. Musicians threatened
Donald Trump with copyright to stop him from using their music at
campaign rallies. The photographer of the infamous image of the
McCloskeys pointing their guns at Black Lives Matter protesters sent
the McCloskeys a copyright demand for their use of that photograph
on greeting cards. Women asserted copyright in their nude selfies to
get their intimate photographs removed from revenge porn websites.
All these stories have one thing in common: they all involve copyright
owners using copyright to advance noncopyright interests. This Article refers to these actions as “weaponizing copyright.”
This Article examines the widespread phenomenon of copyright
weaponization. By granting authors exclusive rights in their works,
copyright allows authors to realize financial and economic gains for
their works. This is supposed to incentivize authors to create more
works, which benefits society and increases dissemination of
knowledge and information. This means that, in copyright’s standard
use, copyright owners assert their copyright against unauthorized uses
of their works when necessary to preserve their market exclusivity
and economic interests.1 But that is not always the case, and it appears
increasingly that copyright is being used to achieve other objectives.
These other objectives do not fit within the traditional economic framings of copyright, and are unrelated to the economic incentives that
copyright confers in order to incentivize creation. In some of these
1. See Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2435 (2016).
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stories, copyright is weaponized to silence criticism and speech. In
other instances, the objective is to hide and bury information. Some
assertions of copyright are intended to punish or retaliate. Other assertions of copyright involve attempts to protect the copyright owner’s
personal reputation or dignitary rights. Another objective is to protect
privacy in personal and intimate information. In none of these stories
are individuals asserting copyright to protect their market exclusivity
or economic interests — the intended purposes of copyright.
Through examining instances of copyright weaponization, this
Article seeks to accomplish three goals. First, it exposes the widespread use of copyright for noncopyright purposes. It identifies five
common noncopyright objectives that copyright owners seek to
achieve through weaponization: to silence and erase facts, suppress
criticism and speech, punish and retaliate, protect reputation and moral rights, and preserve privacy. Second, this Article explains how copyright became the weapon par excellence to serve these noncopyright
goals, why individuals weaponize copyright instead of pursuing
claims under other laws, and what the prevalence of this practice reveals about copyright’s role in society today. Third, this Article attempts to challenge the presumption that weaponizing copyright is
always harmful and must be discouraged, and then attempts to rely on
moral intuition to judge the good weaponization from the bad
weaponization. It does so by exploring the power dynamics and blurry
lines between weaponization by aggressors to punish, erase, and suppress, and weaponization by the vulnerable to preserve, defend, and
protect personal interests. Ultimately, this Article attempts to resolve
two important questions: whether copyright should serve certain
noncopyright objectives but not others, and whether there is a fair and
just way to manage the increasingly pervasive practice of weaponizing copyright.
At this point, it is important to clarify two points. The first is that
not all weaponized or noncopyright uses of copyright are bad, and the
second is that not all typical copyright uses are good. This Article’s
use of the term weaponizing copyright is not intended to imply that all
noncopyright uses of copyright are unjustified or in bad faith. As explored below, a weapon can be in the hand of an aggressor to cause
harm and further disempower the powerless, or it can be in the hand
of the vulnerable to even the playing field, upend traditional power
structures, and provide safety, shelter, and resistance. In some of the
noncopyright objectives explored below, copyright is weaponized by
individuals in a more powerful position to silence, suppress, and further subjugate. In others, this power dynamic shifts when copyright is
weaponized by the vulnerable or traditionally defenseless to protect
themselves from harm. Therefore, for the purpose of this Article,
weaponizing copyright refers to uses of copyright to achieve noncopy-
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right objectives, regardless of whether the reasons for those uses may
seem justified. Furthermore, there is no denying that there are many
other problematic and abusive uses of copyright, such as overreaching
copyright claims, copyright trolling, anticompetitive uses of copyright, or even abusive claims of copyright over employee creations.2
However, these uses of copyright are ultimately driven by preserving
market exclusivity and economic interests. Therefore, even though
these uses can be problematic, harmful, or abusive, they are nevertheless excluded from this Article’s analysis because they are not advanced for noncopyright purposes.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines weaponizing
copyright, identifies recent or older high-profile instances of this behavior, and briefly touches on the harms posed by copyright weaponization. It categorizes instances of copyright weaponization based on
the noncopyright objectives that individuals seek to achieve, and explores the five common objectives that copyright owners pursue in
weaponizing copyright: to silence and erase facts, to suppress and
censor criticism and speech, to punish and retaliate, to protect reputation and dignity, and to preserve privacy. Part III explains why, in all
the described instances of copyright weaponization, individuals rely
on copyright instead of pursuing other legal claims to achieve their
objectives. This includes acknowledging copyright’s expansive role in
society today, and explaining why copyright is superior to other legal
solutions for achieving noncopyright objectives. Part IV surveys three
common approaches to handling assertions of copyright for noncopyright purposes. It critically examines the benefits and concerns with
each approach, and highlights the difficulties in creating a fair and just
legal framework to discourage copyright weaponization without inadvertently foreclosing the ability of vulnerable members of society to
defend themselves from harm. Finally, Part V highlights the complications with attempting to categorize copyright weaponization based
on overlapping objectives or motives. This Part uses examples from
Part II to demonstrate the difficulties with drawing clear lines between
2. See, e.g., John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245, 278–80 (2015)
(describing assertions of copyright by Universal, Prince, Warner Bros. as “ill advised,” but
nevertheless motivated by maximizing profits and protecting the economic market for the
copyrighted works); Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property
Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 565–75 (2015) (describing assertions
of copyright to protect the owner’s market beyond the copyright and examples of copyright
trolling); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of
Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 800–03 (2015) (describing overbroad employment agreements assigning copyright, including copyright to ideas conceived by an employee, to their employer). See generally Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57
STAN. L. REV. 901 (2014) (describing anticompetitive behavior in terms and provisions in
copyright licensing agreements).
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different forms of copyright weaponization, and the problems with
attempting to map legal frameworks onto blurry and uncertain moral
intuitions.

II. WEAPONIZING COPYRIGHT
Copyright encourages the creation and dissemination of socially
valuable works to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”3
It does so by promising a copyright owner market exclusivity in their
creative works.4 Therefore, when we envision a typical copyright infringement dispute it might involve, for instance, a copyright owner
asserting their copyright against an infringer who reproduces a copyrighted work without authorization or an infringer who incorporates a
song without obtaining a license. Because every unauthorized copy an
infringer makes, sells, or uses is one less copy someone will buy or
license from the copyright owner, the copyright owner asserts their
copyright to prevent these infringing uses from supplanting their market in their works. In other words, under copyright’s standard rationale, a copyright owner’s objective in asserting copyright is to
ensure their market exclusivity in their work and to protect their economic interests.5
Copyright owners, however, do not always assert copyright to
protect their market exclusivity or economic interest in their copyrighted works. In 1988, Judge Leval, writing for the Southern District
of New York, warned that copyright has the ability to be used “as an
aggressive weapon to prevent the publication of embarrassing revelations and to obstruct criticism.”6 We have become more aware of individuals using copyright for other reasons, and copyright owners
today “often pursue IP disputes for reasons having little to do with
revenue streams, creativity, or intellectual labor.”7 For instance, dur3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See id. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.” Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 259 (2006) (“Unlike its cousins
property law and the First Amendment, which bear the weight of values such as autonomy,
culture, equality, and democracy, in the United States intellectual property is understood
almost exclusively as being about incentives.”).
6. New Era Publ’ns Int’l. ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1502 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
7. Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67, 73
(2018). See generally Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 1; Fromer, supra note 2;
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2020); Eric Goldman
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ing the election season, a number of musicians asserted copyright to
stop the Trump campaign’s unauthorized use of their copyrighted
songs at his political campaign rallies.8 These musicians asserted their
copyright not because the Trump campaign failed to pay them a licensing fee to use their songs, but because they did not want their
songs associated with Trump or his polarizing politics.9 Women have
asserted copyright to take down intimate photos of themselves that
their ex-partners shared online without their consent.10 These women
did not assert their copyright because they were motivated to protect
their own exclusive right to market those photographs; instead, they
asserted copyright to prevent the dissemination of their private and
intimate images.11 The copyright threats Harvey Weinstein’s team
orchestrated against journalist Ronan Farrow were not based on a
market or financial interest in the copyrighted material that Farrow
was supplanting, but were an attempt to silence Weinstein’s victims
and suppress Farrow’s publication and dissemination of Weinstein’s
sexual misconduct.12 All of those uses of copyright are attempts to
achieve objectives other than protection of the market exclusivity and
economic interests in a copyrighted work. In other words, these are
uses of copyright to vindicate noncopyright interests. This Article
identifies these uses, and other assertions of copyright to protect personal rather than economic interests, as weaponizing copyright.
The following sections highlight the different ways copyright is
weaponized to vindicate interests that have nothing to do with protecting the market exclusivity or economic interests in copyrighted works,
and briefly explains the harms posed by copyright weaponization. In
order to demonstrate the widespread expansiveness of this practice,
the sections below describe both recent and older high-profile examples of copyright weaponization, and categorize these instances based
on the objectives that copyright weaponizers seek to achieve. The
practice is likely more expansive than this Article can capture, especially considering the many disputes that are quietly settled when content is voluntarily taken down, or when content is quickly removed by
online platforms in response to copyright takedown requests. In each
& Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU L. REV. 929 (2019); Tehranian,
supra note 2.
8. Cathay Y. N. Smith, Political Fair Use, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2028–29
(2021).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 7, at 82–87. See generally Amanda Levendowski, Note,
Using Copyright To Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422
(2014).
11. See infra Section II.E.
12. See RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO
PROTECT PREDATORS 234 (2019).
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of the instances described below, individuals use copyright to attempt
to achieve noncopyright objectives. These objectives include punishment and retaliation, erasing facts and burying information, suppressing speech and censoring criticism, protecting reputation and dignitary
interests, and preserving privacy.
A. Weaponizing Copyright to Punish and Retaliate
The expansion and growth of the internet for social content has
made it easier to weaponize copyright, including for the purpose of
punishing, retaliating, or harming another party’s interests. Copyright
owners have asserted DMCA takedown notices, commonly known as
“copyright strikes,” against YouTubers to punish them for using racist
or sexist language; asserted infringement actions to punish parties for
exercising their legal rights; and filed claims against rivals out of
spite. In each of these instances, copyright is weaponized to punish
and retaliate. Similar to spite cases in real property law,13 the primary
objectives the property rightsholders seek to achieve in these scenarios are to punish, retaliate, or harm another party or their interests. Recent or high-profile instances of this behavior include gaming
company Campo Santo and fellow Twitch gamer Alinity copyright
striking PewDiePie for making racist and sexist comments, Sony Music suing musicians who exercise their copyright termination rights
against Sony, TD Bank enjoining its former “rock star” president’s
new book out of vindictiveness, and Hustler publisher Larry Flynt
filing a retaliatory copyright claim against Reverend Jerry Falwell.
PewDiePie, whose real name is Felix Kjellberg,14 is a popular Internet celebrity who became famous for streaming videos of himself
playing video games and commenting on other people’s gameplay on
YouTube and Twitch, a livestreaming video service.15 On a number of
occasions, PewDiePie has made anti-Semitic, racist, or sexist comments and jokes on camera in his streams,16 a tendency that has
13. See generally Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse
of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444 (2013).
14. Robert Moran, Who is PewDiePie, YouTube’s Record-Setting Personality?, THE
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(Aug.
27,
2019),
https://www.smh.com.au/
entertainment/celebrity/who-is-pewdiepie-youtube-s-record-setting-personality-20190827p52l7a.html [https://perma.cc/Q4H2-YNNW]. As of October 2020, PewDiePie’s YouTube
channel
had
over
100
million
subscribers.
PewDiePie,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/PewDiePie [https://perma.cc/8VMK-MTDW].
15. Tobey Grumet, AOC Garners over 5 Million Views Playing ‘Among Us’ on Twitch,
DECIDER (Oct. 23, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://decider.com/2020/10/23/aoc-among-us-twitch/
[https://perma.cc/KJQ2-TC8X]. These livestreams often capture the player, their facial
expressions and verbal comments, and the video games they are playing.
16. Rolfe Winkler, Jack Nicas & Ben Fritz, Disney Severs Ties With YouTube Star
PewDiePie After Anti-Semitic Posts, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2017, 12:28 AM),
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earned him multiple copyright strikes on YouTube.17 In one instance,
while playing the video game PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds in a
livestream, PewDiePie shouted an offensive and vicious racist slur.18
In response, Campo Santo, the producer of another game called Firewatch, filed a copyright strike against PewDiePie to take down all of
the videos featuring PewDiePie playing Firewatch.19 Campo Santo is
not the producer of PlayerUnknown’s Battleground, and there was no
evidence that PewDiePie used any racist language while playing any
of Campo Santo’s games. Nevertheless, in a series of tweets, Campo
Santo’s co-founder Sean Vanaman justified the copyright strike: “I am
sick of this child getting more and more chances to make money off
of what we make . . . . He’s worse than a closeted racist: he’s a propagator of despicable garbage that does real damage to the culture
around this industry.”20 Notably, Campo Santo sacrificed its own financial interest to punish “a very rich man who yells casual racist insults in front of millions of people.”21
In addition to Campo Santo, another Twitch personality named
Alinity also called for a copyright strike after PewDiePie called her
and other female Twitch celebrities “stupid Twitch thots” in a stream
featuring one of her Twitch videos.22 Alinity publicly called for the
“copy strike” of PewDiePie’s video, explaining23:
The reason I reacted the way I did is because frankly
I am so frustrated and tired of the rampant sexism in
https://www.wsj.com/articles/disney-severs-ties-with-youtube-star-pewdiepie-afteranti-semitic-posts-1487034533 [https://perma.cc/C9QA-QLFX]; Kevin Roose, What Does
PewDiePie
Really
Believe?,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Oct.
9,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/09/magazine/PewDiePie-interview.html
[https://perma.cc/EBM8-KYGN].
17. See
Copyright
Strike
Basics,
YOUTUBE
HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000?hl=en [https://perma.cc/DJ7V-AFGQ]
(explaining what a copyright strike is).
18. Adi Robertson, Why Was It so Easy to Weaponize Copyright Against PewDiePie?,
VERGE
(Sept.
12,
2017,
8:20
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/12/
16287688/pewdiepie-racism-firewatch-campo-santo-dmca-copyright-ban
[https://perma.cc/56LC-XKT2].
19. Timothy B. Lee, Here’s What the Law Says About PewDiePie’s Fight with Campo
Santo,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Sept.
12,
2017,
8:30
AM),
https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2017/09/heres-what-the-law-says-about-pewdiepies-fightwith-campo-santo/ [https://perma.cc/3L2B-JYXY].
20. Owen S. Good, Firewatch Creator Vows DMCA Retaliation Against PewDiePie for
Racist Slur Used in Stream, POLYGON (Sept. 10, 2017, 7:43 PM),
https://www.polygon.com/2017/9/10/16285188/pewdie-pie-racist-slur-firewatch-retaliationdmca [https://perma.cc/9Y3Q-2U5B].
21. Robertson, supra note 18.
22. Steve Asarch, Pewdiepie and Alinity Drama Explained: What’s a Copyright Strike?,
NEWSWEEK (May 23, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/pewdiepie-alinitytwitch-copy-strike-youtube-drama-reddit-941546 [https://perma.cc/R98Z-AD8J].
23. Id.
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online communities. I take issue with someone like
[PewDiePie] degrading and minimizing women to
what is largely a very young audience. That kind of
nonsense spills over and ends up on my stream
where I end up being harassed for 6 hours.24
Both Campo Santo and Alinity were explicit about their intentions, and neither asserted copyright against PewDiePie to protect the
market exclusivity or economic interests in their works. Instead, the
primary objective of their copyright strikes was to punish PewDiePie
for his racist and sexist comments.
In 2019, the long-standing “vindictive” copyright infringement
claim TD Bank filed against its former founder and president Vernon
Hill was finally resolved.25 Vernon Hill founded Commerce Bank
(“Commerce”), which was later acquired by TD Bank.26 Hill was
once described as “the closest thing that the staid banking industry has
to a rock star.”27 During Hill’s time as CEO of Commerce, from 2006
to 2007, he wrote a book manuscript about his business philosophy
and his tenure at Commerce.28 He assigned his copyright in the manuscript to Commerce.29 Before the book was published, however, the
relationship between Hill and the bank soured, leading Commerce to
terminate Hill’s employment and cancel its plans to continue pursuing
publication of Hill’s manuscript.30 After leaving Commerce, Hill
founded Metro Bank UK and decided to write and publish another
book called FANS! Not Customers: How to Create Growth Companies in a No-Growth World, detailing Hill’s banking philosophy and
his founding of Metro Bank UK.31 To write FANS!, Hill borrowed
heavily from his original manuscript.32 After FANS! became available
on Amazon and other retailer establishments, TD Bank registered
Hill’s original manuscript with the U.S. Copyright Office and, in
2012, filed copyright takedown requests demanding retailers remove

24. Id.
25. See Pamela Samuelson, Withholding Injunctions in Copyright Cases: Impacts of
eBay, 63 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 35) (draft available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3801254
[https://perma.cc/9EUXN2PA]) (describing TD Bank’s assertion of copyright as a case “smacked of vindictiveness”).
26. TD Bank, N.A. v. Hill (TD Bank I), No. 12-7188, 2015 WL 4523570, at *1 (D.N.J.
July 27, 2015).
27. TD Bank N.A. v. Hill (TD Bank III), 928 F.3d 259, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2019).
28. Id. at 266.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 267.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 266–67.
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FANS! from their shelves.33 A number of retailers complied with TD
Bank’s demand.34 Even though TD Bank had no intention of publishing Hill’s original manuscript, it nevertheless filed a copyright infringement suit against Hill seeking to permanently enjoin his
publication and dissemination of FANS!.35 In 2016, a court granted
TD Bank a permanent injunction and it was not until three years later,
in 2019, that an appellate court vacated the permanent injunction
when it considered the injunction’s harm to the public interest
weighed against TD Bank’s interest.36 In that analysis, the court explicitly recognized that TD Bank’s interest was limited because it pursued its injunction against FANS! “not to safeguard the commercial
marketability of a work but merely to suppress unwelcome speech.”37
Even though this case “smacked of vindictiveness” and the legal case
ultimately failed,38 TD Bank was successful in using copyright to
suppress the dissemination of an author’s book for years.
In certain instances, copyright is weaponized by parties who are
already in legally adverse relationships. Recently, Sony Music Entertainment (“Sony”) filed a retaliatory copyright infringement claim
against musicians who asserted their legal right to terminate their
copyright transfers to Sony.39 Under copyright law, authors who transferred their copyrights after January 1, 1978 have the right to terminate those transfers 35 to 40 years after transfer.40 Musicians John
Lyon and Paul Collins filed notices to terminate the transfer of their
copyrights to Sony for their musical sound recordings “Here Comes
The Night, Live It Up,” “The Beat,” and other songs.41 In response,
Sony filed suit against Lyon and Collins for, among other things, contributory copyright infringement.42 Specifically, Sony claimed in their
suit that Sony owned the artwork on Lyon’s and Collins’s music al33. Id. at 267.
34. TD Bank, N.A. v. Hill (TD Bank I), No. 12-7188, 2015 WL 4523570, at *4 (D.N.J.
July 27, 2015).
35. TD Bank III, 928 F.3d at 286. See also TD Bank v. Hill (TD Bank II), No. 12-7188,
2016 WL 3448264, at *2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2016) (granting permanent injunction).
36. TD Bank II, 2016 WL 3448264, at *2; TD Bank III, 928 F.3d at 286.
37. TD Bank III, 928 F.3d at 284.
38. See Samuelson, supra note 25, at 35.
39. Eriq Gardner, Sony Suing Musicians for Allowing Attorney to Use Album Artwork,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 5, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
thr-esq/sony-suing-musicians-for-allowing-attorney-to-use-album-artwork
[https://perma.cc/JFW2-H5RW].
40. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1976).
41. Blake Brittain, Sony Can’t Defeat Claims over Musicians’ Copyright Terminations,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 1, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/sonycant-defeat-claims-over-musicians-copyright-termination [https://perma.cc/E7QR-KFTC];
Johansen v. Sony Music Ent. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 1094, 2020 WL 1529442 at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2020).
42. See Gardner, supra note 39.
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bums, and that Lyon and Collins were using those cover images for
their copyright termination dispute without Sony’s authorization.43
Sony’s assertion of copyright against Lyon and Collins appeared to be
purely retributive, meant to punish the musicians for exercising their
copyright termination rights and, perhaps, to warn other musicians
who might consider doing the same.
Similarly, while instances of weaponizing copyright have certainly increased over the past years, there are older instances involving
copyright weaponized to punish enemies in long-standing legal feuds.
A famous retaliatory copyright claim involved Hustler Magazine
(“Hustler”) founder Larry Flynt and Moral Majority leader Reverend
Jerry Falwell in the 1980s. Flynt was the founder and publisher of the
monthly pornographic magazine Hustler. Falwell was the leader of
Moral Majority, a political action group founded to further a conservative and religious agenda.44 Falwell was vocal about his disapproval of Flynt and Hustler, blaming Flynt for “the decay of all
morals.”45 In response to Falwell’s insults, Flynt decided to “start
poking some fun at” Falwell46 by publishing a full-page parody advertisement mocking Falwell and his mother in Hustler’s November
1983 issue.47 In response, Falwell sued Flynt and Hustler for libel,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.48
Their infamous dispute ultimately resulted in the landmark 1988 Supreme Court decision Hustler v. Falwell49 and inspired the 1996
blockbuster movie The People vs. Larry Flynt.50 In order to fund his
litigation against Hustler, Falwell made unauthorized copies of Hustler’s parody ad and distributed them in letters to his supporters to
raise funds to sue “‘Porno King’ Larry Flynt” for “defil[ing] the good

43. See id.
44. Larry Flynt, My Friend, Jerry Falwell, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2007, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/la-op-flynt20may20-story.html [https://perma.cc/KY7H-CMWK];
Moral
Majority,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Moral-Majority
[https://perma.cc/Y7E2-9A2K].
45. Flynt, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also Jerry Falwell Talks About His First Time, available at
https://boingboing.net/images/falwell-hustler-first-time.jpg [https://perma.cc/T6TR-YUJJ].
48. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988).
49. Id.
50. See
The
People
vs.
Larry
Flynt,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_People_vs._Larry_Flynt [https://perma.cc/5WHL-UQEN]
(describing the movie being “based in part on the U.S. Supreme Court case.”); see also
Edward Guthmann, Milos Forman Explains Why He Made ‘The People vs. Larry Flynt,’
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 27, 1996), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-199612-27-9612270059-story.html [https://perma.cc/C62Y-526H].
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name of my dear mother.”51 In clear “retaliation for Falwell’s prior
legal action against him,” Hustler sued Falwell for infringing the copyright to its parody ad.52 After four years of litigation, the court finally
dismissed Hustler’s retaliatory copyright suit under copyright’s fair
use doctrine.53
Asserting copyright out of spite to punish another party or to retaliate against perceived wrongdoings is clearly not why copyright
law grants authors exclusive rights to their copyrighted works. Not
only is this use not aimed at protecting the economic interests of copyright holders, it also fails the purpose of copyright to “promote the
progress of science and useful arts”54 when copyright owners’ rights
are used only to harm one another. In these cases, when copyright
owners assert their right “just for the reason that it will harm others,”
they are exceeding their jurisdiction.55 As Professor Larissa Katz explains, when a property owner asserts their property right against another out of spite:
She has in that case used her power qua owner not to
determine a worthwhile use of the thing but to . . .
use her position just in order to harm someone else,
out of spite or to gain leverage. When an owner’s
decision about her thing is designed just to cause
harm to another — whether as an end in itself or
even as a means to some further valuable end — she
abuses her right.56
Weaponizing copyright to punish or retaliate out of spite can
harm the public without necessarily providing the public with a corresponding gain. In these spite cases, the rights conferred to copyright
owners to incentivize creativity and dissemination are being used for
abusive reasons that go beyond their charge. They defeat and contravene the purpose of granting exclusive rights to works under copyright. While some of the goals of these assertions, such as to punish
racist or sexist outbursts on video, may appear worthwhile or justifiable, they can still harm the public interest when they result in the loss
of valuable social commentary, cultural expression, or intangible arti-

51. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (C.D. Cal. 1985),
aff’d, 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
52. Tehranian, supra note 2, at 265.
53. Hustler Mag., Inc., 606 F. Supp. at 1532.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
55. Katz, supra note 13, at 1451.
56. Id.
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facts, or make those works unavailable to the public and inaccessible
to those who seek them.
B. Weaponizing Copyright to Erase Facts and Bury Information
Copyright is also weaponized to erase facts and bury information.
Men assert copyright to silence victims from speaking out about sexual abuse and to bury evidence about their bad behaviors. Doctors
claim copyright to wipe negative reviews of their professional services. Politicians assert copyright to hide their politically extremist
views. Public figures or their families threaten copyright to bury embarrassing family histories and facts. Copyright owners have filed
copyright infringement claims, sent threatening cease and desist letters, and filed online takedown demands in efforts to erase facts and
bury information. In these instances, instead of protecting their exclusive right to disseminate their copyrighted works, copyright owners
assert their copyright to prevent the dissemination of those works. In
some of these instances, copyright owners’ attempts fail to make the
information disappear. In others, individuals succeed in removing
content for a short period of time or even permanently. The success of
the weaponization often depends on the power dynamics between the
parties, their access to legal resources, and the motivation of the
weaponizer compared with the putative infringer.57 Although several
copyright owners described below were ultimately unsuccessful at
achieving their objective, there are likely many more cases that are
unreported or undiscoverable in which copyright weaponization succeeded in burying information. It is axiomatic that the more successful
copyright owners are at weaponizing copyright to silence or erase
information, the less likely their abusive actions are to be discovered.
As the #MeToo movement began exposing the sexual misconducts of men in power, some of those men attempted to use copyright
law to conceal facts about their bad behaviors and silence victims
from exposing their misconduct. Some credit the escalation of the
#MeToo movement to journalist Ronan Farrow’s 2017 bombshell
New Yorker article that exposed Harvey Weinstein’s long history of
sexually exploiting and assaulting women in Hollywood.58 During
Farrow’s research into those incidents, including interviews with
Weinstein’s victims, Farrow faced an orchestrated attempt from The
Weinstein Company (“TWC”) and Farrow’s own employer NBCUni57. See infra Section III.A.
58. See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:47 AM),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assaultharvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [http://perma.cc/789E-RL2H].
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versal News Group (“NBC”)59 to assert copyright against Farrow and
the media companies he was working with.60 Specifically, Farrow
described an instance when he received a cease and desist letter from
TWC asserting that the copyright to the information he collected and
prepared were “the property of NBC and do not belong to [him], nor
[was he] licensed by NBC to use any such interviews.”61 The same
letter demanded that Farrow “turn over all [his] work product relating
to TWC,” and threatened media outlets that worked with Farrow, including The New Yorker, that they were “on notice of [the] legal
claims against them.”62 These copyright threats were clearly meant to
suppress the information that Farrow was collecting about Weinstein’s serious sexual misconducts, and to silence Weinstein’s victims.
After consulting with an attorney, and despite these threats, Farrow
eventually went ahead and published his exposé of Weinstein.63
Businesses have also learned to weaponize copyright to remove
unflattering or negative reviews of their goods and services. For instance, in 2010, the media began reporting on a trend involving doctors who attempt to claim copyright ownership over patient reviews in
order to silence bad reviews.64 For instance, Dr. Stacy Makhnevich
asserted copyright to takedown negative reviews of her New York
dental practice from the online consumer review website Yelp.com.65
In 2010, Robert Lee went to see Makhnevich for dental work.66 One
of the documents that Lee signed prior to his dental appointment at
Makhnevich’s office was a “Mutual Agreement to Maintain Privacy,”
which preemptively assigned to Makhnevich the copyright to any reviews that Lee were to write about Makhnevich’s dental services.67
After his dental work, Lee shared his negative experience on Yelp on
August 24, 2011, writing: “Avoid at all cost! . . . Scamming their cus59. See generally FARROW, supra note 12.
60. Id. at 234.
61. Id. at 235. Excerpts of the cease and desist letter in Farrow’s book did not explain the
theory under which NBC could claim copyright ownership of Farrow’s interviews; NBC’s
argument was likely under copyright’s work-made-for-hire doctrine, because Farrow was
employed by NBC when he gathered much of his resources.
62. Id. at 235.
63. See Farrow, supra note 58.
64. Joe Mullin, Dentist Who Used Copyright to Silence Her Patients Is on the Run, ARS
TECHNICA (July 28, 2013 6:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/dentistwho-used-copyright-to-silence-her-patients-is-on-the-run/ [https://perma.cc/D24H-CDPV];
see also In the News, DOCTORED REVIEWS, https://www.doctoredreviews.com/press/in-thenews/ [https://perma.cc/BTD9-XEZA].
65. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 254 n.37; see also Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at
947–50 (describing businesses that engage in “pre-creation acquisitions” of consumer reviews of their services in order to scrub negative reviews left on consumer review content
platforms).
66. Mullin, supra note 64.
67. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 254 n.37.
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tomers! Overcharged me by about $4000 for what should have been
only a couple-hundred dollar procedure.”68 In response, Makhnevich’s
office asserted copyright to Lee’s review and sent a copyright
takedown demand to Yelp.com to remove it.69 Makhnevich also sent
Lee a demand letter for $100 a day for copyright infringement and
threatened to pursue “all legal actions against him.”70 Makhnevich’s
assertion of copyright in this instance was clearly designed to silence
Lee’s criticism and to make his negative review of Makhnevich’s services disappear.71 As of September 2021, Lee’s review is available on
Yelp but appears under reviews “that are not currently recommended”
by Yelp.72 Currently, on the Yelp page for Stacy Makhnevich, DDS,
there are 42 reviews that Yelp has categorized as reviews “that are not
currently recommended,” and 341 reviews that were removed for violating Yelp’s Terms of Service.73 There are only six “Recommended
Reviews” on Yelp for Stacy Makhnevich, DDS.74
Politicians and public figures also use copyright law to try to bury
unpopular policies, past statements, or embarrassing family histories.75 For instance, during Sharron Angle’s 2010 campaign for U.S.
Senate against Harry Reid, Angle’s campaign asserted copyright to
erase the extreme conservative views that she shared in the past.76
While Angle was campaigning for the Republican nomination in Nevada’s Senate race, she published a campaign website advertising her
views on abolishing Social Security and the Department of Education.77 After gaining the Republican nomination, Angle’s campaign
68. Mullin, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Jodie Griffin, The Doctor Will Be Right with You . . . After You Sign over Your
Copyright, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (June 8, 2020), https://www.publicknowledge.org/
blog/the-doctor-will-be-right-with-youae%c2%a6-after-you-sign-over-your-copyright/
[https://perma.cc/DB2T-2F5L]; see also Eric Goldman, The Latest Insidious Tactic to Scrub
Online
Consumer
Reviews,
FORBES
(July
23,
2013,
12:07
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/07/23/the-latest-insidious-tactic-to-scrubonline-consumer-reviews/?sh=588a57f73e1e [https://perma.cc/5QWG-7VPQ].
72. See 42 Reviews for Stacy Makhnevich, DDS that Are Not Currently Recommended,
YELP,
https://www.yelp.com/not_recommended_reviews/stacy-makhnevich-dds-newyork?not_recommended_start=20 [https://perma.cc/H55R-H6U9].
73. Id.
74. See Stacy Makhnevich, DDS, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/biz/stacy-makhnevichdds-new-york [https://perma.cc/9Z5R-YSNL].
75. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 2068; see also Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689,
692 (W.D. Va. 2014) (asserting copyright infringement against student who posted videos
of Caner’s past speeches on YouTube where Caner made (false) statements that he “had
grown up as a Muslim in Turkey, steeped and trained in jihad, in a tradition that went back
several generations in his father’s family”); David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 547–48 (2010) (detailing the Joyce estate’s use
of copyright to control scholarly reporting on family history).
76. Smith, supra note 8, at 2035.
77. Id.
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removed that website and replaced it with one expressing more moderate views to win over moderate and independent voters in Nevada.78
Harry Reid’s campaign recovered Angle’s previous website and reproduced it on a webpage called “The Real Sharron Angle.”79 In response, the Angle campaign sent Reid a cease and desist letter
asserting that the Reid campaign’s reproduction of Angle’s website
infringed her copyright in her website.80 Angle threatened “to pursue
all available legal remedies” against Reid and his campaign because
“[y]our Web site is like you . . . it’s your intellectual property . . . . So
they can’t use something that’s yours, intellectual property, unless
they pay you for it or get your permission.”81 Angle’s copyright
threats were meant to hide her extremist views and policy statements
from voters and the public. Despite Angle’s threats, The Real Sharron
Angle webpage remained up, and there is no record that Angle pursued any legal action against Reid.82
Similarly, TV-doctor Drew Pinsky (“Drew”) in 2020 attempted to
use copyright to conceal dismissive statements he made early in the
pandemic. At the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S.,
Drew publicly dismissed the outbreak’s seriousness on his shows Ask
Dr. Drew and podcast Dr. Drew After Dark.83 Specifically, Drew
made statements “repeatedly suggest[ing] the coronavirus would be
not as bad as the flu” and claiming that “the probability of dying of
coronavirus was less than being hit by an asteroid.”84 On April 2,
2020, YouTuber Dr Droops compiled a five-minute video “of all of
the inaccurate, contradictory things that Dr. Drew has said about

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia Katyal, The Fair Use Senator: Can Harry Reid
Really Post Sharron Angle’s Old Campaign Web Site?, SLATE (July 9, 2010, 3:02 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/07/can-harry-reid-post-sharron-angle-s-oldweb-site.html [https://perma.cc/969X-7U7Z].
81. Smith, supra note 8, at 2035–36; John W. Dean, How Harry Reid Might Respond to
Sharron
Angle’s
Planned
‘SLAPP’
Suit,
FINDLAW
(July
9,
2010),
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-harry-reid-might-respond-to-sharronangles-planned-slapp-suit.html [https://perma.cc/PG7Q-MCQZ].
82. See Smith, supra note 8, at 2035–36; see also Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 80
(“[W]e applaud Reid’s willingness to stick to his guns . . . and continue posting his archived
version of Angle’s Web site, even at the risk of a lawsuit.”).
83. Associated Press, Dr. Drew Pinsky Apologizes for Coronavirus Comments: ‘I Got It
Wrong’,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
7,
2020,
8:20
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2020/04/07/coronavirus-dr-drewpinsky-addresses-covid-19-criticism/2960027001/ [https://perma.cc/R79Q-DXKK].
84. Id.; see also Kate Cox, Dr. Drew Apologizes for Being a COVID-19 Denier after
Copyright Silliness, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 6, 2020, 3:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2020/04/dr-drew-coronavirus-supercut-restored-to-youtube-after-copyrighttakedown/ [https://perma.cc/X6V6-AN3T].
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coronavirus” and posted it on YouTube.85 It was circulated on social
media, including in one instance by a reporter tweeting the link and
accusing Drew of being “a snake oil salesman” and “a disgrace.”86 In
response, Drew Pinsky Inc. filed a copyright takedown notice to remove the video compilation from YouTube.87 Drew also threatened
social media users resharing the video compilation that “[i]nfringing
copywrite [sic] laws is a crime. Hang on to your retweets. Or erase to
be safe.”88 YouTube took down the video compilation in response to
Drew’s copyright threats and takedown notice. Eventually, the video
became available again and there were no suits against social media
users that shared the video compilation.89
While several of the above examples are recent or involve copyright assertions on the Internet, the use of copyright to control narratives and historical records has long been utilized by public figures,
such as Howard Hughes,90 Ron Hubbard,91 Richard Wright,92 J.D.
Salinger,93 and James Joyce.94 The estate of James Joyce (“the Estate”), for instance, has a lurid history of controlling reporting on and
scholarly research into the Joyce family.95 The Estate fiercely guarded
the Joyce family history, especially stories about Joyce’s daughter
Lucia, and threatened scholars with copyright for their research and
publication of information related to her.96 Joyce’s daughter Lucia
was a “troubled young woman” who was treated by psychiatrists and
committed to a mental hospital at the age of 25.97 She spent most of
her life in mental hospitals and died in one in 1982.98 Carol Shloss, an
English professor, tried to write and publish a true biography about
Lucia and her influence on Joyce’s writing.99 The Estate threatened
85. Dr Droops, Compilation of all of the inaccurate, contradictory things that Dr. Drew
has
said
about
coronavirus,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
2,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsVRA485Go0&feature=youtu.be
[https://perma.cc/LE45-XTC9].
86. @yashar,
TWITTER
(Apr.
4,
2020,
12:18
PM),
https://twitter.com/yashar/status/1246472340243767296 [https://perma.cc/Y8WQ-GFWG].
87. Cox, supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. See TV Doctor Believes Copyright Will Save Him From Criticism, Is Very Wrong,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.eff.org/takedowns/tv-doctor-believescopyright-will-save-him-criticism-very-wrong [https://perma.cc/Z3RU-YQYC].
90. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
91. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
92. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
93. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
94. Olson, supra note 75.
95. Id. at 550–53.
96. Id. at 550–51.
97. Id. at 550.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Shloss with copyright infringement for her plan to describe certain
aspects of Lucia’s life and to quote family documents relating to Lucia.100 The Estate further threatened Shloss’s publisher with infringement if it were to use, quote, or publish any of the objectionable
materials related to Lucia.101 Because of these threats, Shloss was
constrained to cut a significant amount of pertinent information related to Lucia from her final published book.102 Even though the Estate
never filed copyright claims against Shloss or her publisher, their
copyright threat achieved the Estate’s goal of erasing embarrassing
family facts from Shloss’s book.103
In the 1988 decision New Era Publications International v. Henry
Holt and Co., Judge Pierre Leval warned that by “registering a copyright, public figures who are the expected focus of public interest
could use this supposed commercial protection as an aggressive
weapon to prevent the publication of embarrassing revelations and to
obstruct criticism.”104 In his opinion, he listed a variety of hypotheticals, including:
[a politician who] campaigns on his decorations for
wartime bravery and his strong law and order position. A journalist seeks to publish some of [the politician’s] old letters which, if read carefully between
the lines, seem to acknowledge that he did not participate in combat, was mistakenly decorated and spent
his military career as a black marketeer in association with hoodlums; []
a religious leader is renowned for his selfless kindness, liberality of spirit and sympathy for the sufferings of others. A biographer seeks to publish extracts
from his early letters and journals which display
greed, callous indifference, and employ the language
of racial and religious bigotry; []
100. Id. at 550–53.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 553.
103. After being forced to remove pertinent information about Lucia from her book,
Shloss ended up self-publishing that information on a website. The Estate sent her cease and
desist letters asserting copyright infringement, and Shloss filed for declaratory relief in June
2006 in response. After the court refused to dismiss Shloss’s suit, the parties settled. See
Cynthia Haven, Stanford Researcher Gets Six-figure Settlement from James Joyce Estate,
STAN. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2009), https://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/september28/shlossjoyce-settlement-092809.html [https://perma.cc/94R3-ZBUA].
104. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1502
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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the popular benign mayor of a city sent numerous
memos to opponents in various conflicts threatening
to “cut your heart out,” “castrate you,” “bust your
kneecaps,” etc. A journalist questions the accuracy
of the mayor’s public image and quotes from these
memos.105
In all of these hypotheticals, Judge Leval surmised that a copyright owner could assert copyright to attempt to silence others, erase
history, and control their image or reputation by making these bad
facts about them disappear. If putative infringers do not have access to
legal resources, or are not in a position to fight back against these attempts to weaponize copyright, copyright can successfully erase history. Unfortunately, the hypotheticals that Judge Leval posed in 1988
are eerily similar to instances described in this Section and later on in
this Article.106
Using copyright to erase information is against the public interest,
and can damage the historical record and subvert the ability to combat
disinformation. It also appears to directly contravene the very purpose
of copyright “to promote the progress of science and useful arts”
when copyright is the very tool used to prevent the public dissemination of thoughts and works.107 Even though these attempts are not always ultimately successful, they still cause harm to the individuals on
the receiving end, and could potentially discourage others from publishing or reporting on information important to the public. Even if
there may be alternative ways to express the facts or ideas in these
works without copying them, the “inability to use the most evocative
expression possible diminishes the power of a speaker’s message.”108
It is often “the words used by the public figure (or the particular manner of expression) that are the facts calling for comment.”109 Furthermore, using copyright to erase facts can “remove the most credible
evidence to validate or contest those facts and ideas,” which “creat[es]
opportunities to undermine the search for truth in the first place.”110
As Professors Eric Goldman and Jessica Silbey explained, asserting
copyright to erase facts and bury information can create “memory
105. Id. at 1502.
106. See, e.g., infra Part V, the case of Slade Neighbors v. Veronica Monger, 2:20-cv04146 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2020), in which Neighbors sues his ex-girlfriend for disseminating
the abusive text messages and emails that he sent her.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
108. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright has
in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (2000).
109. New Era Publ’ns Int’l., 695 F. Supp. at 1502.
110. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 935.
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holes” in society by “relegat[ing] the facts and ideas which those
works contain to persist[] only in people’s memories.”111 This can
allow facts or ideas to “fade out of circulation — and eventually fade
away altogether.”112 In this way, “[b]y facilitating the selective suppression of information for private benefit,” certain copyright owners
are empowered to reclaim historical narrative and control what and
how society thinks.113
C. Weaponizing Copyright to Suppress Criticism and Speech
Copyright is also weaponized to censor criticism and suppress
speech. Religious organizations assert copyright to remove content
critical of their religion or their religious works. Movie studios use
copyright to suppress negative reviews of their films. Public figures
file copyright suits to censor criticism or commentary about their racist behaviors. While the instances described in this Section are similar
to Section B above in that they involve using copyright to control narrative, the outcome that copyright owners seek to achieve in each section differ significantly. Specifically, unlike the scenarios discussed in
Section II.B above, copyright is weaponized in this Section not to
prevent the dissemination of the copyrighted works, nor to erase copyrighted works or the information within those works. Instead, the cases described below involve copyright owners asserting copyright to
control what others say about them or their works. They use copyright
to control narrative, public opinion, and social commentary about
them or their works. The instances described in this Section do not
involve copyright owners attempting to use copyright to make their
own works or words disappear.
Recently, Netflix weaponized copyright to take down tweets that
were critical of its controversial new French film Cuties. Cuties is a
coming of age story about an 11-year old immigrant in Paris trying to
find her identity.114 The film includes scenes of the main character
performing sexualized dance routines with her dance crew and being
in adult situations.115 The film, as well as its controversial poster,116
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 935–36.
114. Todd Spangler, ‘Cuties’ Controversy: Surge in Netflix Cancellations Was ShortLived,
Data
Shows,
VARIETY
(Sept.
25,
2020,
3:46
AM),
https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/cuties-cancel-netflix-account-surge-data-1234783460/
[https://perma.cc/7BUG-T3CG].
115. Id.
116. Tom Grater, Netflix Apologizes for “Inappropriate” ‘Cuties’ Poster that Was Criticized for Sexualizing Children, DEADLINE (Aug. 20, 2020, 8:25 AM),
https://deadline.com/2020/08/netflix-apologizes-inappropriate-cuties-poster-criticizedsexualizing-children-1203018498/ [https://perma.cc/BH59-DWLE].
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were criticized on social media, prompting a #CancelNetflix campaign117 and a criminal indictment in Texas for promoting “lewd visual material depicting a child.”118 Much of the criticism on social
media involved users sharing clips from the movie or retweeting the
Netflix-released trailer of the movie with comments such as:
“IMAGINE A CHILD SEEING THIS #Cuties #Netflix #CancelNetflixCuties,” or “Go ahead and try to justify how this film is an appropriate representation of 11 year olds . . . . #CancelNetflix.”119 In
response, Netflix filed a dozen takedown requests to remove critical
posts of its movie from Twitter.120 While some of the posts were sharing clips from the actual movie, other critical posts were simply retweeting the film’s trailer, which Netflix had publicly released.121 In
its takedown requests, it appeared that Netflix not only sought to remove the film clips or trailer that these negative tweets shared, but
also targeted the full tweets — in other words, it sought to remove the
critical commentary in addition to the film clips or trailer they
shared.122 Netflix also only targeted its takedown demands to negative
commentary about its movie, leaving alone positive tweets that also
shared the same film clips or trailer.123 Ultimately, Netflix was successful at removing its targeted reshared film clips and trailers from
Twitter, but not the critical commentary.124 Nevertheless, Netflix’s
targeted assertion of copyright against negative reviews of its film
was a clear use of copyright to suppress criticism and censor the
speech of critics.
Religious organizations also weaponize copyright to remove and
suppress critical or negative commentaries of their religion or religious works.125 In July 2020, FaithLeaks, a whistleblower site operat117. Spangler, supra note 114.
118. Maria Cramer, Netflix Is Charged in Texas with Promoting Lewdness in ‘Cuties’,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/business/cuties-netflixtexas.html [https://perma.cc/JM27-4P3U].
119. Kate Cox, Netflix Files Copyright Claims Against Tweets Criticizing Movie, Trailer,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Nov.
5,
2020,
3:22
PM),
https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2020/11/netflix-dmca-takedown-requests-hit-negative-tweets-about-cuties/
[https://perma.cc/2A4C-KPZ5].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ernesto Van der Sar, Netflix Targets Critical ‘Cuties’ Tweets With Copyright
Takedown Requests, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 5, 2020), https://torrentfreak.com/netflixtargets-critical-cuties-tweets-with-copyright-takedown-requests-201105/
[https://perma.cc/QFN7-ZCAW].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Blake Brittain, Jehovah’s Witnesses Sue FaithLeaks Owners Over Convention Videos, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 30, 2020, 4:12 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
us-law-week/jehovahs-witnesses-sue-faithleaks-owners-over-convention-videos
[https://perma.cc/ZD8M-3Y47]; Nate Anderson, Scientology Fights Critics with 4,000
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ed by Truth & Transparency Foundation, settled a copyright infringement claim for its unauthorized posting of a number of videos
produced by the Jehovah’s Witnesses for its annual convention.126
During these annual conventions, organizers play videos about the
organization’s faith and Scriptural lessons.127 In 2020, FaithLeaks
obtained these videos in advance of the annual convention and posted
them online, allowing commentary, criticism, and “analysis from exWitnesses on various forums across the Internet.”128 The social benefits of sharing these videos was clear. As one ex-Witness explained:
the videos simply deserve to be made public for the
sake of criticism . . . while a [convention] speaker’s
ideas could be dismissed as personal thoughts, the
videos are known by attendees to be directly form
[sic] the organization . . . by making these videos
publicly available, opportunity is given for open and
unbiased discussion and criticism.129
Nevertheless, the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ publishing entity Watch
Tower filed copyright takedown demands to have the videos removed
and sued FaithLeaks and its founders for copyright infringement.130
Due to its inability to maintain the high costs of litigation, Faith Leaks
agreed to settle and remove all content from its websites, to never
again publish any copyrighted materials belonging to Watch Tower,
and to pay Watch Tower $15,000.131
The Church of Scientology is similarly reputed to weaponize
copyright in order to remove content critical of the organization.132 In
DMCA Takedown Notices, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 8, 2008, 1:12 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/09/scientology-fights-critics-with-4000-dmcatakedown-notices/ [https://perma.cc/8QCV-G9DS]; Fromer, supra note 2, at 563–64 (discussing the case Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110,
1112–13 (9th Cir. 2000), where one religious organization sued the other for distributing
copies of religious text that “conveyed outdated views that were racist in nature.”).
126. Press Release, Truth & Transparency, Truth & Transparency Settles with Watch
Tower (July 20, 2020), https://www.truthandtransparency.org/press/2020/07/20/truthtransparency-settles-with-watch-tower/ [https://perma.cc/FZR4-88AB].
127. Brittain, supra note 125; Annual Conventions of Jehovah’s Witnesses,
JEHOVAH’S
WITNESSES,
https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/conventions/
[https://perma.cc/PU4C-5VQ3].
128. Hemant Mehta, Jehovah’s Witnesses Sue Owners of FaithLeaks for Posting 74 Convention
Movies,
FRIENDLY
ATHEIST
(May
1,
2020),
https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2020/05/01/jehovahs-witnesses-sue-owners-offaithleaks-for-posting-74-convention-movies/ [https://perma.cc/N7SD-RKVD].
129. Id.
130. Brittain, supra note 125.
131. Press Release, Truth & Transparency, supra note 126.
132. See, e.g., Evan Hansen, Google Pulls Anti-Scientology Links, CNET
(Apr. 22, 2002, 12:58 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-pulls-anti-scientology-
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2008, for instance, an entity representing the Church sent more than
4,000 DMCA takedown notices to YouTube within a 12-hour time
period to remove videos critical of Scientology.133 These critical videos included footage from Australian and German news media about
Scientology, footage from a Clearwater City Commission meeting,
and other videos that presented Scientology in a negative light.134 In
all of these instances, the objective of the religious organization’s assertions of copyright was not to protect their market or economic interests in their copyrighted works, but to control the narrative of their
religion and suppress critical commentary or negative opinions about
their organizations.
Public figures may weaponize copyright to suppress criticism of
their past statements or behavior. Michael Savage formerly hosted the
conservative radio talk show the Savage Nation. On October 29, 2007,
the Savage Nation aired a two-hour program in which Savage unleashed an anti-Muslim tirade.135 During that program, Savage encouraged the deportation of Muslims and throwing “them out of [his]
country”; he stated that “Muslims scream[] for the blood of Christians
or Jews or anyone they hate”; he described Islam as “a religion that
teaches convert or kill, a religion that says oppress women, kill homosexuals”; and he labeled “[t]he Quran [as] a document of slavery and
chattel.”136 The Council on American Islamic Relations (“CAIR”)
responded to Savage by posting on its website a four-minute audio
excerpt from the program that addressed and objected to each of Savage’s remarks.137 Savage then sued CAIR for copyright infringement
for its posting of audio excerpts from his radio talk show.138 While the
court ultimately dismissed Savage’s claim under copyright fair use,
CAIR was still forced to absorb the significant costs of defending
Savage’s copyright suit.139 In fact, even though Savage lost this copyright claim against CAIR, Savage seemed to have been emboldened
by his ability to weaponize copyright against CAIR. He later asserted
copyright against Brave New Films for its incorporation into a film of
links/ [https://perma.cc/YQK4-2UMT]; Eva Galperin, Massive Takedown of AntiScientology Videos on YouTube, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2008),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/09/massive-takedown-anti-scientology-videos-youtube
[https://perma.cc/KPL3-4PN5] (discussing the 4000 DMCA takedown notices filed within
12 hours asserting copyright claims against videos with content critical of Church of Scientology); Anderson, supra note 125.
133. Galperin, supra note 132; Anderson, supra note 125.
134. Galperin, supra note 132.
135. Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels., Inc., No. C 07-6076, 2008 WL 2951281, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *6.
139. Tehranian, supra note 2, at 259.

218

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 34

one minute of Savage’s same anti-Muslim rant.140 Savage was able to
have that film removed from YouTube by filing a copyright takedown
notice, which dealt a significant blow to the film by “thoroughly neuter[ing] the power of its concentrated (and expensive) outreach campaign.”141 Savage’s weaponization of copyright successfully achieved
his objective to “silence[] his critics at precisely the right moment.”142
Asserting copyright to suppress criticism seems especially antithetical to free speech. The ease with which copyright owners attempt
to or successfully suppress speech, commentary, or criticism is alarming.143 Even if, ultimately, a putative infringer prevails in countering a
copyright takedown demand or copyright infringement suit, they still
must expend the time, effort, and money to defend an illegitimate
claim. This alone can serve to indirectly suppress speech, as putative
infringers may not be able to sustain the expense of litigation, and
copyright weaponizers may become emboldened to assert similar
claims against other parties. As the court in Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House explained:
The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the
copyright laws at least to the extent that the courts
should not tolerate any attempted interference with
the public’s right to be informed regarding matters of
general interest when anyone seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed to protect interests
of quite a different nature.144
Nevertheless, as discussed below in Part III, because copyright
law already embodies First Amendment safeguards, such as the ideaexpression dichotomy and fair use, courts generally refuse to take on
independent First Amendment analyses in copyright cases, even when
those cases may implicate free speech.145 This allows copyright owners to suppress critical speech either directly through assertions of

140. Id. at 260.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 266 (acknowledging that copyright owners’ ability to exploit copyright to suppress First Amendment rights “is particularly pressing”).
144. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Lumbard, J., concurring).
145. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 472 U.S. 539, 555–56,
560 (1985) (rejecting National Enterprises’ contention that “First Amendment values require a different rule . . . when the information conveyed relates to matters of high public
concern”); Peterman v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 369 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1062 n.4 (D. Mont.
2019).
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copyright infringement claims or copyright takedown demands, or
indirectly through mere threats to assert copyright.146
D. Weaponizing Copyright to Protect Reputation and Moral Rights
Copyright is also weaponized to protect reputation, moral rights,
and other dignitary interests. Some of the most recent and visible assertions of copyright to vindicate these personal interests were the
copyright assertions by musicians against Donald Trump for his campaign’s unauthorized uses of music at rallies. Other copyright assertions have involved copyright owners attempting to prevent alt-right
or racist uses of copyrighted characters, or to remove the inclusion of
copyrighted works from controversial propaganda videos. These assertions of copyright are meant to protect copyright owners’ reputations or to prevent their works from being used in ways that copyright
owners disagree with or are morally opposed to. These uses are not
necessarily to protect the exclusive market or economic interests in
copyrighted works. In fact, many of these cases involve copyright
owners who may have previously allowed unauthorized uses of their
copyrighted works until those uses involved people or causes that they
opposed.147 Unlike the Section above, the copyright owners in this
Section are not asserting their copyright to suppress speech that they
disagree with; they just do not want their copyrighted works used
alongside that speech.
“It’s not very often that nerdy intellectual property lawyers get
asked to fight the alt-right . . . [b]ut when we do, we’re ready.”148 That
was a statement from the attorney representing Matt Furie in his copyright claims against the Daily Stormer, InfoWars, and other alt-right
or neo-Nazi media that were using his comic character creation Pepe
the Frog.149 Artist and comic book creator Furie created Pepe, a green
anthropomorphic frog, as a character in his comic cartoon book series

146. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 75, at 553 (discussing Joyce estate’s weaponization of
copyright to suppress critical speech).
147. See, e.g., Brian Frye, Giorgio Angelini, Arthur Jones & Louis Tompros on Matt Furie & Pepe the Frog, IPSE DIXIT PODCAST 5:00–6:00, 32:30–33:00 (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://shows.acast.com/ipse-dixit/episodes/giorgio-angelini-arthur-jones-louis-tompros-onmatt-furie-pe [https://perma.cc/2KQV-TZDX].
148. Ross Todd, ‘Feels Good Man’: Wilmer Lawyers Play Key Supporting Role in New
Doc About the Travails of Pepe the Frog Creator, LITIG. DAILY (Sept. 2, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/2020/09/02/feels-good-man-wilmer-lawyers-play-keysupporting-role-in-new-doc-chronicling-pepe-the-frog-creator/
[https://perma.cc/77XWQU96] (quoting Pepe’s copyright attorney Louis Tompros).
149. Id.; Frye, supra note 147, at 0:32–0:50.
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Boy’s Club.150 Furie’s Pepe was a “chill” and “good natured” frog, an
“everyman frog” who “live[d] with his three roommates” and liked
“hanging out, playing pranks[,] . . . eating pizza, partying, that kind of
thing.”151 Memes of Pepe quickly went viral and were popularized by
celebrities and Internet users alike. While Furie did not authorize
these early memetic uses of Pepe, he also did not take any actions to
stop these uses of his creation.152 Then the alt-right, white supremacist
movement seized upon Furie’s Pepe, eventually co-opting Pepe and
turning him into a racist and anti-Semitic symbol of white supremacy.
They recreated Pepe “to appear with a Hitler-like mustache, wearing a
skullcap or a Ku Klux Klan hood” and used Pepe’s appropriated image “in hateful messages aimed at Jewish and other users on Twitter.”153 Pepe the Frog became so radicalized and symbolic of the
white supremacist movement that he was placed on the AntiDefamation League’s hate symbols database.154 Furie asserted his
copyright against alt-right organizations’ uses of Pepe.155 He sued
InfoWars and others for copyright infringement for their unauthorized
uses of Pepe in a Make America Great Again (MAGA) poster and in
other racist, anti-Semitic, or alt-right propaganda works. These cases
ended up settling.156 Furie’s motivation to assert his copyright against
these racist uses of Pepe was not to protect his financial interest in
Pepe, but to prevent uses of Pepe that he disagreed with or to which
he was morally opposed.157
150. Giaco Furino, Pepe the Frog’s Creator Talks Making Zine History, VICE (Aug. 3,
2016, 12:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qkw97d/pepe-frog-creator-matt-furietalks-zine-history [https://perma.cc/D6C6-88GB].
151. Adam Serwer, It’s Not Easy Being Meme, ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2016, 12:25 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/its-not-easy-being-green/499892/
[https://perma.cc/688K-D6BZ].
152. Frye, supra note 147, at 5:00–6:10.
153. Christopher Mele, Pepe the Frog Meme Listed as a Hate Symbol, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/us/pepe-the-frog-is-listed-as-a-hatesymbol-by-the-anti-defamation-league.html [https://perma.cc/4XL3-VV46].
154. Pepe
the
Frog,
ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE,
https://www.adl.org/
education/references/hate-symbols/pepe-the-frog [https://perma.cc/9CJC-EKHT]; Mele,
supra note 153.
155. See Frye, supra note 147, at 19:15–20:00.
156. See, e.g., Joint Stipulation To Dismiss Case, Furie v. Infowars, LLC, No. 18-CV01830 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2019), ECF No. 134; Stipulation of Dismissal (with prejudice),
Furie v. Logsdon, No. 17-CV-00828 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2018), ECF No. 38; Holly
Swinyard, Pepe the Frog creator wins $15,000 settlement against Infowars, GUARDIAN
(June 13, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jun/13/pepe-the-frog-creatorwins-15000-settlement-against-infowars [https://perma.cc/B29X-EAV2]; Michael Kunzelman, Settlement resolves lawsuit over Pepe the Frog paintings, SPOKEMAN-REVIEW (Mar.
9, 2018), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/mar/09/settlement-resolves-lawsuitover-pepe-the-frog-pai/ [https://perma.cc/LY2N-NLT2].
157. See Frye, supra note 147, at 14:30–15:00, 19:15–21:00; Dave Fagundes & Aaron
Perzanowski, Abandoning Copyright, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 507 (2020) (“Matt
Furie’s infringement lawsuit against InfoWars’s unauthorized use of Pepe the Frog was
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Similarly, artist Anish Kapoor sued the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) when it included an image of Kapoor’s popular Chicago
Cloud Gate sculpture, also known as the Bean, in an NRA propaganda
video.158 Cloud Gate is a stainless-steel sculpture standing at about
thirty-three feet tall, representing a large silver bean.159 The sculpture
is located in Millennium Park in downtown Chicago, where it reflects
the skyline and serves as a popular tourist destination.160 In 2017, the
NRA released a video called “The Violence of Lies,” which featured a
spokeswoman delivering a straight-to-camera message criticizing the
media, schools, Hollywood elites, and President Obama for inciting
protests against Donald Trump.161 The video sparked immediate criticism, with commentators calling it “an open call to violence to protect
white supremacy,” “disgusting,” and “revolting and frightening.”162 In
the video, an image of Cloud Gate in Chicago briefly “appears when
[the spokeswoman] says, ‘[a]nd then they use their ex-president to
endorse the resistance.’”163 Kapoor sued the NRA for its unauthorized
use of his sculpture in the video. The NRA defended its use, calling
Kapoor’s suit an attempt to “muzzle First Amendment-protected
speech just because he apparently disagrees with the message conveyed.”164 Nevertheless, the NRA settled the case by agreeing to remove the image of Cloud Gate from the video.165
Photographer-mom Laney Griner asserted copyright to stop the
notorious politician Steve King from using a photograph of her son.166
Griner took the now-famous photograph of her son, Sam, on the beach
featuring Sam holding up a fist full of sand. Sam’s photograph beinspired not by pecuniary considerations but by Furie being ‘dismayed by Pepe’s association with white supremacy, anti-Semitism, and the alt-right.’”).
158. Sopan Deb, N.R.A. to Pull Image of Sculpture from Its Video, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/arts/design/anish-kapoor-nra-bean.html
[https://perma.cc/GT4X-JRLE].
159. Joël Chevrier, Anish Kapoor’s “Cloud Gate”: Playing with Light and Returning to
Earth, Our Finite World, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 29, 2018, 12:36 PM),
https://theconversation.com/anish-kapoors-cloud-gate-playing-with-light-and-returning-toearth-our-finite-world-102272 [https://perma.cc/UA2D-86XB].
160. Id.
161. Jonah Engel Bromwich, N.R.A. Ad Condemning Protests Against Trump Raises Partisan Anger, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/us/nra-adtrump-protests.html [https://perma.cc/2NUK-YW6W]; see also Randy Wakeman, The Violence of Lies: Dana Condems [sic] Violence, YOUTUBE (June 30, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2lTlrhTtFJc [https://perma.cc/8EUV-ZGZR] (preserving a copy of the video).
162. Bronwich, supra note 161.
163. Deb, supra note 158.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Ed Payne, ‘Success Kid’ Appeals to Social Media to Get His Dad a Kidney Transplant, CNN (Apr. 15, 2015, 4:30 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/15/living/success-kiddad-needs-help/ [https://perma.cc/5P28-G3PB].
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came the viral meme known as “Success Kid,” resulting in CNN calling Sam “likely the Internet’s most famous baby.”167 During King’s
campaign for Congress, King’s campaign used the Success Kid meme
on the WinRed fundraising website to solicit campaign donations.168
King is infamous for making offensive and inflammatory xenophobic
and racists remarks and is frequently criticized by politicians on both
sides of the aisle.169 After learning about King’s unauthorized use of
Success Kid, Griner sent King’s campaign a cease and desist letter
demanding the removal of her photo.170 Griner also publicly stated
that she “would never attach [her son’s] face willingly to any negative
ad . . . but Steve King is just the worst of the worst . . . bigotry is just
the antithesis of what we want to be the association with the
meme.”171 On December 30, 2020, Griner sued Steve King and his
campaign for infringing her copyright in Success Kid.172 This litigation is ongoing.
Asserting copyright to control who uses a copyrighted work, or
how a copyrighted work is used, seems like a right that would appropriately be within a copyright owner’s control. A copyright owner
should be able to pick and choose who is permitted to use their copyrighted work and how their copyrighted work is used. At the same
time, some of the uses that copyright owners find most objectionable
may be uses that benefit the public interest or offer the most social
value. Take, for instance, the seminal copyright fair use case Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.173 In that case, author Alice Randall
wrote The Wind Done Gone, an unauthorized parody of Margaret
Mitchell’s historic fiction bestseller Gone With The Wind.174 The
Wind Done Gone retold the events of Gone With The Wind through
the eyes of a slave in order mock the book’s veneration of the Antebellum south and antiquated views on slavery.175 Mitchell’s estate
sued Randall for copyright infringement for her unauthorized use of
167. Id.
168. Alan Yuhas, Mother of ‘Success Kid’ Demands Steve King Stop Using His Meme,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/us/politics/steve-kingsuccess-kid-meme.html [https://perma.cc/NLP8-2PFC].
169. See Eli Watkins, Steve King Warns Against Presuming ‘Every Culture Is Equal,’
CNN (May 29, 2019, 9:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/politics/steve-kingculture-founding-fathers-iowa/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q8N4-829W]; Manu Raju,
Ashley Killough & Clare Foran, Steve King Removed from Committee Assignments Following
Racist
Comments,
CNN
(Jan.
15,
2019,
8:24
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/14/politics/mitch-mcconnell-steve-king-condemnation/
index.html [https://perma.cc/8PST-DW5C].
170. Yuhas, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Griner v. King, No. 20-CV-03848 (D.D.C. June 21, 2021).
173. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 1259.
175. Id. at 1270.
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the plots and characters from Gone With the Wind.176 Randall’s use
was particularly objectionable to Mitchell’s estate because it criticized
the beloved classic novel, and included themes of homosexuality and
miscegenation.177 The court found Randall’s use to be entitled to a fair
use defense.178 But this is just one example of how asserting expressive control over uses of copyrighted works to protect dignitary interests could have the potential effect of also suppressing valuable social
commentary and expressive speech.
E. Weaponizing Copyright to Preserve Privacy
Copyright is also weaponized to preserve privacy. Women use
copyright to remove intimate photographs of themselves from the Internet. Celebrities assert copyright to stop the dissemination of private
videos or images. Photographers assert copyright to protect the privacy of individuals featured in their photographs. All of these assertions
of copyright involve the attempt to protect personal privacy interests,
and not the exclusive market or economic interests in the copyrighted
work.
Nonconsensual pornography, also known as revenge porn, “involves the distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent.”179 Some of these images are taken without consent,
and others are obtained with consent or perhaps taken by the individual herself and shared “within the context of a private or confidential
relationship.”180 Revenge porn is shockingly common; one in twentyfive Americans have reported either being threatened with or being
victims of nonconsensual pornography.181 However, neither criminal
laws nor privacy laws have yet to fully catch up with this alarming

176. Id. at 1259.
177. See Tehranian, supra note 2, 281 (“[T]he Mitchell estate was particularly uncomfortable with The Wind Done Gone — not just because it was an unauthorized recasting of
Gone with the Wind, but precisely because of its content.” (citing Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at
1259)).
178. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276–77. After the 11th Circuit vacated the lower court’s
preliminary injunction and remanded to the lower court, the parties reached an agreement to
dismiss the action. Consent Order, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., No. 01-cv00701 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2001), Court Docket No. 51 (May 17, 2002).
179. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
180. Id.
181. Jessica M. Goldstein, ‘Revenge Porn’ Was Already Commonplace. The Pandemic
Has Made Things Even Worse., WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2020 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/revenge-porn-nonconsensualporn/2020/10/28/603b88f4-dbf1-11ea-b205-ff838e15a9a6_story.html
[https://perma.cc/94MF-HMBM].
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trend, so women turn to copyright.182 Consider Hilary’s story. Hilary
and her partner were in a long-distance relationship.183 During their
relationship, Hilary sent her partner intimate, nude selfies and videos
of herself posing topless or simulating sexual acts.184 After the relationship ended, without informing Hilary or seeking Hilary’s consent,
Hilary’s ex-partner posted those intimate photos and videos on the
Internet in order to humiliate her.185 In response, Hilary filed applications with the U.S. Copyright Office to register over 100 images that
she had shared with her ex-partner.186 Hilary then filed copyright
takedown demands to the content platforms hosting those photographs
to demand their takedown.187 Hilary did not assert copyright in order
to protect the economic or market interests in her intimate photographs or her exclusive right to distribute those images. Her objective,
instead, was to protect her privacy, remove those photos from the Internet, and stop the dissemination of her private images and videos.188
Copyright owners sometimes assert copyright to protect the privacy of other individuals featured in their copyrighted works. Wedding photographer Kristina Hill sued Public Advocate of the United
States (“Public Advocate”) when it used an engagement photograph
Hill took of Brian Edwards and Thomas Privitere to support Public
Advocate’s anti-marriage equality agenda.189 Public Advocate is a
conservative activist group that opposes same sex marriage.190 The
Southern Poverty Law Center designated Public Advocate as a hate
group for its anti-gay activism.191 Public Advocate found Hill’s en182. Infra Section III.B.1. See also Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I Had to Copyright
My
Breasts,
CNN
(Apr.
27,
2015
1:32
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/26/technology/copyright-boobs-revenge-porn/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ASL7-HC8Y]; Amanda Levendowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge
Porn: Copyright Law?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2014/02/our-best-weapon-against-revenge-porn-copyright-law/283564/
[https://perma.cc/6XQ3-SYWA].
183. Fink, supra note 182. “Hilary” is a pseudonym.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1935 (2019)
(“[C]opyright law may also provide an effective tool in sexual-privacy cases involving the
distribution of intimate images created by victims . . . [V]ictims could file notice and
takedown requests with content platforms after registering the copyright of their images.”);
Citron & Franks, supra note 179, at 359–60; Levendowski, supra note 182.
189. Complaint, Hill v. Public Advocate of the United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D.
Colo. 2014) (No. 12-cv-02550), ECF No. 5.
190. About Us, PUB. ADVOC. OF THE U.S., https://www.publicadvocateusa.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/P625-6W9Y].
191. Caitlin Gibson, Loudoun Supervisor Eugene Delgaudio’s Advocacy Organization
Designated
a
‘Hate
Group,’
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
26,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-state-of-nova/post/eugene-delgaudios-
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gagement photograph online, which featured Edwards and Privitere
holding hands and kissing. Public Advocate then reproduced that photograph on political mailers to criticize Colorado politicians and their
pro-same sex marriage policies. Specifically, the mailer named the
political candidate it was opposing and asked in a caption over the
photograph: is this “[the politician’s] idea of ‘Family Values?’”192 Hill
sued Public Advocate for copyright infringement.193 In this instance,
Hill was not asserting her copyright in the photograph to protect the
market interest of that engagement photo or to seek lost licensing revenue from Public Advocate. Hill’s objective was to protect and vindicate the violation of her clients’ privacy.194
Celebrities also assert copyright to protect their privacy. “This
[case] reads like a telenovela, a Spanish soap opera. It pits music celebrities, who make money by promoting themselves, against a gossip
magazine, that makes money by publishing celebrity photographs,
with a paparazzo, who apparently stole the disputed pictures, stuck in
the middle.”195 That was the court’s introduction to the copyright infringement case involving pop singer and model Noelia Monge and
gossip magazine Maya Magazines.196 Monge married Jorge Reynoso,
her agent, in a secret wedding in Las Vegas.197 In order to uphold her
“image as a young, single pop singer,” the couple kept their wedding
a secret.198 Two years later, six photos of that secret wedding were
leaked to Maya Magazines, which published them with the headline
“The Secret Wedding of Noelia and Jorge Reynoso in Las Vegas.”199
Monge sued Maya Magazines for copyright infringement for publishing her copyrighted photographs without authorization.200 Her objective for asserting copyright was not to protect the economic interests
in those photos, but to protect her privacy and hide the fact that she
had secretly married.201 Other celebrities, such as Hulk Hogan,202 Fred
Durst,203 and Bret Michaels and Pamela Anderson204 have similarly
advocacy-organization-designated-a-hate-group/2012/03/26/gIQAuakbcS_blog.html
[https://perma.cc/CW7N-L2DV].
192. Daniel Nasaw, Privitere and Edwards: Our Photo Used in Anti-Gay Union Ad, BBC
(Oct. 4, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19804286 [https://perma.cc/TT4CCGPD]. See also Complaint, Hill, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347.
193. Complaint, Hill, 35 F.Supp.3d 1347.
194. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law?, in
VISIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE 191, 191–99 (Marc Rotenberg ed., 2015).
195. Monge v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1168–69.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1169.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
203. Durst v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 05-CV-01575 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005).
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asserted copyright to protect their privacy and prevent dissemination
of their personal sex tapes.205
In all of these instances, copyright owners’ primary objective in
asserting copyright appears to be to protect their own or another individual’s privacy. These assertions were not aimed at protecting the
copyright owners’ exclusive right to disseminate the copyrighted
works, nor to protect the economic interests in these private images or
videos. In fact, in many of these cases, the copyright owner had no
intention to ever disseminate these copyrighted works, nor to seek to
exploit a legitimate market for their works. In some of these instances,
it is understandable that copyright owners should be able to protect
deeply personal and intimate details about their lives. In other instances, however, weaponizing copyright to protect privacy could hinder
the rights of others to express facts or to comment on issues of public
concern. Indeed, in certain instances, there appears to be a thin line
between weaponizing copyright to protect privacy and weaponizing
copyright to erase facts and bury information.206 Both objectives involve copyright owners that do not seek to exploit a legitimate market
for their copyrighted works, and both involve copyright owners suppressing the dissemination of their copyrighted works. Similar blurry
lines exist between other objectives copyright owners seek when asserting or weaponizing copyright.207
But regardless of whether the copyright owner asserts copyright
to protect privacy, to protect other personal interests, or to achieve
other noncopyright objectives, why use copyright? Why don’t individuals rely on other areas of the law, such as privacy laws or moral
rights, to protect these personal objectives? The Part below explores
why individuals choose copyright and how copyright has become a
weapon par excellence for individuals to achieve these noncopyright
objectives.

III. COPYRIGHT, THE WEAPON PAR EXCELLENCE
The previous Part demonstrated the prevalence of copyright owners weaponizing copyright to achieve noncopyright objectives. But
why use copyright to achieve those objectives? In many of the instances described above, it appears that copyright owners should have
alternative, and possibly more applicable, legal solutions to achieve
their objectives. For instance, why do individuals who want to pre204. Michaels v. Internet Ent. Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
205. See Gilden, supra note 7, at 90–91.
206. See infra Part IV.
207. See infra Part IV.
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serve their privacy use copyright instead of relying on statutory or
common law rights of privacy to prevent dissemination of intimate
and private information? Why don’t creators rely on moral rights to
prevent the tarnishment of their copyrighted works? Why is it so easy
for copyright owners to use copyright to silence speech and suppress
legitimate criticism? How did copyright become the weapon par excellence208 for individuals to achieve objectives that are unrelated to
copyright’s purpose in protecting market exclusivity or economic interests?
This Part identifies two equally significant reasons that copyright
has become the weapon par excellence for achieving the noncopyright
objectives described above. The first Section analyzes what makes
copyright an attractive legal tool to weaponize. As discussed below,
copyright is, in many ways, a superior weapon to wield, especially in
light of its judicial and extrajudicial applications and processes and
limited First Amendment scrutiny. The second Section examines the
gaps and limitations in other areas of the law, including privacy, moral rights, and false endorsement, leading individuals to assert copyright to fill those gaps and vindicate their personal interests.
A. Why Copyright?
Several factors combine to make copyright a superior weapon to
wield to silence and erase facts and information, suppress criticism
and critical speech, punish and retaliate, protect reputation and moral
rights, and prevent the dissemination of private information. For one,
it is exceedingly easy to claim copyright in any works of expression,
including tweets, texts, e-mails, selfies, etc. It is also easy to suppress
content through the mere assertion of copyright, either with threatening letters or through copyright’s extrajudicial notice and takedown
process. Furthermore, copyright claims are subject to limited First
Amendment review, and there are practical and legal limitations to
copyright defenses that might discourage copyright weaponization.
All of these factors combine to make copyright a superior weapon.
1. Everything Is Copyrighted and Everyone Is an Infringer
It is easy for individuals to weaponize copyright because copyright attaches to expressive works the minute they are created in a
tangible medium, and any unauthorized uses of that expressive work
can violate copyright. Copyright protects “original works of author208. Inspired by John Tehranian’s description of copyright as “the weapon par excellence of the 21st-century censor.” Tehranian, supra note 2, at 250.

228

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 34

ship fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.”209 It is easy to meet
copyright’s low-threshold eligibility requirements. Works of authorship include literary, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, and musical
works.210 Fixation simply requires that the work is fixed in any tangible medium and perceivable for a period of more than a transitory
duration.211 Originality for copyright merely requires that a work is
independently created and exhibits a modicum of creativity.212 This
means that “every Facebook post, Instagram photo, and YouTube video created with a smartphone potentially gives rise to a new bundle of
copyright interests.”213 The nude photographs that individuals take of
themselves, for instance, are copyrighted original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. The text messages or emails that abusers send to their partners are copyrighted literary
works. The racist or COVID-denying rants that radio show or podcast
hosts spew are protected by copyright. Parody ads, video games, political campaign websites, Twitch videos, album covers, film trailers,
sex tapes, journal entries, unpublished manuscripts, religious videos
and books, engagement and wedding photos, and cartoon memes all
meet copyright’s originality, fixation, and work of authorship requirements to be copyrighted works.
In addition to the ease of creating a copyrighted work, copyright
owners can also easily make out a prima facie case for infringement.214 The owner of a copyrighted work has the right to prevent
anyone else from reproducing, publicly displaying, distributing, and
creating derivatives of their works. For instance, Harry Reid’s reproduction of Sharron Angle’s website technically violated Angle’s exclusive right to reproduce the text on her website.215 Dr Droops’
compilation of Dr. Drew’s comments from his radio shows technically violated Dr. Drew’s exclusive right to create a compilation from his
copyrighted commentary.216 Steve King’s use of Success Kid technically violated Laney Griner’s exclusive rights to display and to reproduce her photograph.217 In all of the instances described in Part II
above, individuals assert copyright against technical violations of their
exclusive rights under copyright. In these cases, “the rights they assert

209. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010).
210. Id.
211. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010).
213. Gilden, supra note 7, at 73.
214. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 264.
215. See supra Section II.B.
216. Id.
217. See supra Section II.D.
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fall squarely within the doctrinal scope of IP laws . . . they follow the
letter, but violate the spirit, of IP.”218
Because everyone almost every day creates copyrighted works,
and so many activities technically infringe copyright through the reproduction, display, or creation of derivatives of copyrighted works,
copyright is an effective weapon to silence, erase, suppress, censor,
punish, protect, and achieve other noncopyright objectives.
2. Copyright Disputes Are Expensive and Copyright Weaponizers Are
Motivated
In addition to being easy to assert, copyright cases can be expensive to defend. In many of the scenarios described above in Part II,
there can be an imbalance of power between the often more powerful
or well-funded copyright owner and the putative infringer.219 It is often easier, less expensive, and less risky for putative infringers to capitulate to takedown demands instead of trying to fight copyright
owners who weaponize copyright to achieve noncopyright objectives.
For instance, in the copyright infringement litigation filed by Watch
Tower against Faith Leaks over its posting of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ copyrighted videos, Faith Leaks was ultimately forced to settle
because it was unable to raise enough funds to continue defending
Watch Tower’s infringement claims.220 After settling the case, the
founder of Faith Leaks stated, “[t]he result is absolutely agonizing and
has been emotionally, mentally, and physically taxing on us, as it goes
against our core values. . . . The result of not meeting [our fundraising] goal was that we had to engage in settlement negotiations with
the extremely well-funded Watch Tower.”221
Copyright owners that weaponize copyright may also be greatly
motivated to fight putative infringers in order to suppress content, and
may be more aggressive in spending time and money to achieve their
objectives. This is exacerbated by the ease of establishing copyright
and asserting infringement,222 and the limitations on and uncertain
outcomes of copyright defenses.223 For instance, individuals who assert copyright to protect their reputation or to bury evidence of their
bad behaviors are understandably motivated to pursue all remedies
218. Gilden, supra note 7, at 69.
219. See infra Part II. But see Gilden, supra note 7, at 105 (writing that, in the context of
asserting IP to protect privacy concerns, the power dynamic between the parties can often be
flipped. In other words, it is often the vulnerable who use IP to protect their sexual privacy.
This is explored further below.)
220. See Press Release, Truth & Transparency, supra note 126.
221. Id.
222. See supra Section III.A.1.
223. See infra Section III.A.5.

230

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 34

that would help them achieve their goal. Because copyright weaponization’s goal is not about money, but about achieving a personal objective, copyright owners are also not necessarily weighing the costs
of copyright assertions against the financial benefits from asserting
copyright. They are not making rational financial decisions in these
cases because the ultimate benefits to them are not financial. For instance, in a case involving Slade Neighbors, a successful attorney, and
his ex-partner Veronica Monger, Neighbors certainly had a strong
incentive to assert copyright to prevent Monger’s dissemination of the
emotionally abusive text messages and e-mails that Neighbors sent.224
To stop her, he was willing to not only assert copyright to remove that
information from the internet, but also to file a copyright infringement
suit against Monger to ensure that she was permanently enjoined from
ever disseminating his abusive text messages or e-mails again.225 Harvey Weinstein had strong motives to stop Ronan Farrow from reporting on Weinstein’s victims’ accounts of his sexual misconducts.226
Even Netflix Films was likely more motivated to suppress critical
commentary about its film than its critics were motivated to ensure
that their one-off negative comments remained visible.227
3. Copyright’s Remedies Allow Suppression of Content with Limited
First Amendment Review
Copyright owners can seek equitable relief, including injunction,
against dissemination of their works, making copyright an effective
weapon to stop the sharing of content or information. This is exacerbated by the fact that copyright is largely immunized from express
First Amendment checks. Indeed, even though courts disfavor prior
restraint of speech, they “show[] little hesitation in granting preliminary injunctions in cases of copyright infringement, even when the
injunction amounts to a clear prior restraint of speech.”228 Because
“preliminary injunction is a powerful remedy that is often the death
knell of the case and may force settlement or abandonment of the
case,” issuing an injunction could result in suppressing speech without
a trial or consideration of all of the evidence.229

224. See infra Part IV.
225. See infra Part IV.
226. See supra Section II.B.
227. See supra Part II.
228. Tehranian, supra note 2, at 249. But see Samuelson, supra note 25 (finding courts
no longer presume irreparable injury in copyright cases and no longer automatically enjoin
unauthorized or even infringing uses of copyrighted works).
229. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 14 (2016).
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Many of the objectives described in Part II seem to involve attempts to suppress speech, such as weaponizing copyright to censor
criticism or erase facts and information. Courts, however, do not engage in independent First Amendment analyses in copyright cases.
Instead, courts rely on the Copyright Act’s “built-in First Amendment
accommodations” to balance a copyright owner’s right to exclude
with the putative infringers’ right to use the copyrighted works.230
These built-in accommodations include copyright’s idea-expression
dichotomy and copyright’s fair use doctrine.231 Therefore, even in
some of the scenarios described above where it may be obvious that
the copyright owner had a censorial motive for asserting their copyright, courts still analyze those assertions under the fair use doctrine
by balancing the four fair use factors in Section 107 of the Copyright
Act. While copyright may not be “categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment,”232 it is certainly easier for the
would-be censoring party to wield copyright than other tort claims,
such as defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, which are otherwise protected under the
First Amendment.233
4. Copyright’s Extrajudicial Remedy Encourages Weaponization
Copyright provides a powerful extrajudicial process for enforcement through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (“DMCA”)
notice and takedown regime.234 Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (“Section 230”) immunizes content platforms from liability based on user-generated content posted on their platforms, except where that user-generated content infringes intellectual property
laws.235 To make up for that lack of immunity, the DMCA introduced
a notice and takedown regime providing content platforms a safe har230. Eldred v. Ashcroft (Eldred II), 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). See also Peterman v. Republic Nat’l Comm., 369 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1062 n.4 (D. Mont. 2019) (“[T]he [defendant]
cites to no precedent supporting its position that the First Amendment demands an additional layer of protection,” and the defendant’s use of the copyrighted work is not “entitled to
First Amendment protection above and beyond that built into the Copyright Act.”).
231. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); Eldred
II, 537 U.S. at 219; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir.
2001).
232. Eldred v. Reno (Eldred I), 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This statement was
later rejected by the Supreme Court in Eldred II, 537 U.S. at 221 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit spoke
too broadly when it declared copyright’s ‘categorically immune from challenges under the
First Amendment.’”).
233. Tehranian, supra note 2, at 251.
234. John Tehranian, Copyright’s Male Gaze: Authorship and Inequality in a Panoptic
World, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345, 360 (2018).
235. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2018); Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 943.
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bor from liability if they expeditiously remove infringing usergenerated content from their platform.236 This notice and takedown
provision gives copyright owners a quick and easy process to demand
removal of purportedly infringing content from content platforms
such as YouTube and other intermediaries that host user-generated
content. In most instances, once a copyright owner files a takedown
demand, the content platform removes the purportedly infringing content, and the burden then shifts to the user or poster of the content to
file a counter-notice objecting to the removal of their content. Goldman and Silbey describe this process as a “carrot-and-stick incentive”
that can encourage over-suppression of content.237 Specifically, this
process encourages preemptive removal of user-generated content
“regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.”238
Even though the DMCA provides for a counter-notice process,
that process has flaws. First, copyright owners may “time their
DMCA takedown notices carefully . . . [to] have materials removed
online during a particularly damaging interval (as in the Savage case),
regardless of how good a fair-use claim there might be for the use of
those materials.”239 Furthermore, as discussed above, copyright
weaponizers may be greatly motivated to remove unflattering or reputation-damaging information,240 which could encourage them to file
suit in federal court in response to a counter-notice. In that situation,
content platforms are not obligated to restore the purportedly infringing content while the suit is pending, thereby keeping that content
offline and out of the public’s reach.241 This makes the DMCA a copyright weaponizer’s ally. Utilizing DMCA’s takedown process allows
copyright owners to achieve the immediate result of removing content
from online dissemination, and can often result in that content’s permanent removal due to the risk, uncertainty, hassle, and potential expense in filing a counter-notice to object to the removal. While
Section 512(f) of the DMCA allows recipients of meritless DMCA
takedown demands to sue for damages if the filers “knowingly materially misrepresented” that the posted content was infringing,242 and
some recipients have been successful under Section 512(f),243 it is
236. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 944.
237. Id.
238. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1) (2019).
239. Tehranian, supra note 2, at 275.
240. See supra Section III.A.2.
241. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 275–76.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (f) (2019).
243. See, e.g., Online Pol’y Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
In 2003, two college students obtained and posted online leaked email messages between
employees at Diebold, a manufacturer of electronic voting machines. Those email messages
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often cheaper, faster, and less risky for recipients of DMCA
takedowns to remove content than to hire counsel to file suit under
Section 512(f).
DMCA’s notice and takedown process can also be weaponized to
punish and retaliate against content creators like PewDiePie. For instance, after being copyright striked by Campo Santo for using a racist
term in his video stream,244 PewDiePie claimed that the copyright
strike was “a pretty big deal,” because “[i]f I get more than three of
them, my channel will shut down.”245 PewDiePie was referring to
Google’s copyright strike policy for content creation channels like
YouTube,246 under which one copyright strike may affect the content
creator’s ability to monetize their content, and three copyright strikes
will result in the termination of the content creator’s account and any
associated channels, the removal of all videos uploaded to the account, and the inability to create any new channels on the content platform.247 Copyright law, its relative immunity from First Amendment
scrutiny, and the DMCA notice and takedown process thus make copyright an easy weapon to wield.
5. Copyright Defenses Fail to Discourage Copyright Weaponization
A final reason for copyright’s superior ability to be weaponized is
the lack of strong defenses or legal hurdles to stop copyright owners
from succeeding in weaponizing copyright. First, many disputes involving copyright weaponization may not reach a decision on the
merits. Unless the media or social media picks up on the dispute,
these cases of copyright weaponization can go unnoticed or undetectappeared to call into question the accuracy of Diebold’s electronic voting machine’s ability
to accurately tabulate voters’ preferences. Anonymous users on IndyMedia linked to the
online location of those leaked emails. In response, Diebold filed DMCA takedown requests
to demand the removal of those links on IndyMedia, claiming copyright infringement.
IndyMedia’s hosting company and the two college students sued Diebold for violating Section 512(f). The court granted summary judgment finding “that portions of the email archive
were so clearly subject to the fair use defense that no reasonable copyright holder could
have believed that [they] were protected by copyright.” Diebold, Inc. v. Online Policy
Group,
DIGIT.
MEDIA
L.
PROJECT
(Nov.
14,
2007,
10:27),
https://www.dmlp.org/threats/diebold-inc-v-online-policy-group#node-legal-threat-fullgroup-description [https://perma.cc/CTS6-S7Q3] (internal quotations omitted).
244. See supra Section II.A.
245. Julia Alexander, YouTube Accepts Campo Santo’s Copyright Strike Against
PewDiePie, Could Lead to Bigger Issues, POLYGON (Sept. 14, 2017, 5:46 PM),
https://www.polygon.com/2017/9/14/16309430/pewdiepie-campo-santo-strike
[https://perma.cc/NP9G-UAHR] (quoting PewDiePie).
246. See Copyright Strike Basics, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/2814000?hl=en#zippy=%2Cwhat-happens-when-you-get-a-copyright-strike
[https://perma.cc/YS83-JUMK].
247. Id. After one copyright strike, a creator has to go through Copyright School.
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ed. In practice, faced with assertions of copyright infringement, putative infringers often voluntarily remove their offending works,248 or
content platforms take the works down in response to copyright owners’ DMCA copyright takedown demands.249 This means that
weaponization can be effective in suppressing content through mere
assertions of copyright.250 As the Electronic Frontier Foundation explained, “[s]tern threats making vague claims about stolen intellectual
property are often effective even if there’s no legal merit to them.”251
Even when cases do gain attention or make it to court, there are limitations on the defenses that should discourage copyright weaponization such as fair use, copyright misuse, or state anti-SLAPP laws,
discussed below.
Fair use is identified as one of copyright’s built-in First Amendment accommodations, and it would appear to be an effective defense
against many of the scenarios described in Part II.252 Fair use guarantees “breathing space within the confines of copyright.”253 It excuses
otherwise infringing works for the purposes of criticism, commentary,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, and other socially
valuable or transformative uses.254 Defending fair use, however, can
be expensive and time consuming.255 Even defendants with strong fair
use defenses have to expend money and time, including on discovery,
to vindicate their rights.256 Furthermore, fair use results can sometimes be unpredictable because of its fact-specific and case-by-case
analysis.257 This unpredictability has caused some courts and scholars
248. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 947; see also Olson, supra note 75, at 553 (noting that the threat of copyright made the author and publisher preemptively remove content
from manuscript that otherwise would have been fair use).
249. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 282–83.
250. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 947 (threats serve to “effectively suppress content without any judicial oversight”).
251. McKeown, supra note 229, at 13 (internal quotations omitted).
252. See Fromer, supra note 7, at 580 (finding that courts “are more likely to conclude
that there is a fair use defense to infringement when the market effects driving the plaintiff’s
copyright suit are irrelevant.”); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1633 (1982) (“Because the owner’s antidissemination motives make licensing unavailable in the consensual market, and because the free flow of information is at stake, a
strong case for fair use can be advanced in these cases.”).
253. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
254. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018); Cathay Y. N. Smith, Copyright Silencing, 106 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 71, 83 (2021).
255. Id. at 83–84.
256. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 267.
257. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (“in America [fair use] simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007); David Nimmer,
Fairest of Them All and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263,
280 (2003); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
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to describe fair use as “one of the most ‘troublesome’ doctrines,” “billowing white goo,” and “naught but a fairy tale.”258 Even though
scholars disagree on the extent of fair use’s predictability,259 the folklore of fair use’s difficulties can lead putative infringers to shy away
from spending the time and money to defend legitimate fair uses of
copyrighted works.260 Finally, courts can sometimes appear to be
sympathetic to the personal objectives that these copyright weaponizers seek to achieve. For instance, in Hill v. Public Advocate of the
U.S., the court refused to dismiss Hill’s copyright infringement claim
on fair use grounds even though it was clearly asserted to vindicate
personal rather than economic interests.261 The court in Monge v. Maya Magazines similarly dismissed the magazine’s fair use defense
even though its use of the photograph was newsworthy, and it appeared that Monge asserted copyright for the noncopyright purpose of
hiding the fact that she had secretly married her manager.262 Thus,
even though in these cases the putative infringer could articulate relatively strong fair use defenses to the assertions of copyright against
them, the courts refused to dismiss the copyright claims based on fair
use.263 And even if many of the assertions of copyright in Part II could
ultimately be considered fair use, it could cost a putative infringer too
much time and money to reach that final adjudication. Capitulating to
copyright weaponizers’ demands to takedown content is often much
easier.
Other legal solutions, such as copyright misuse or state antiSLAPP laws, also suffer from practical and legal limitations making
them mostly ineffective in discouraging copyright weaponization.
Copyright misuse is an equitable defense that is based on the concept
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1666 (2004) (“Fair use is an ex post determination, a lottery argument
offered by accused infringers forced to gamble, after the fact, that they did not need permission before.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1271, 1284 (2008) (“Fair use . . . remains fairly unpredictable and uncertain in many
settings . . . .”).
258. McKeown, supra note 229, at 4.
259. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537,
2541 (2009) (“[F]air use law is both more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived . . . .”); Smith, supra note 8, at 2064 (finding pattern in fair use
cases involving unauthorized political uses of copyrighted works). See generally Matthew
Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012).
260. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation
Ratchet, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 637 (2019) (“Folklore about litigation odds and outcomes will discourage disadvantaged creators from pursuing claims even when they seem
strong.”).
261. See Hill v. Pub. Advoc. of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014).]
262. See Monge v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2012).
263. Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 1, at 2454 (“[C]ourts are far from universally
sympathetic to the [fair use] defense, even when owners’ suits clearly seek to vindicate only
noneconomic interests.”).
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of unclean hands.264 Copyright misuse has traditionally been applied
in cases where owners assert copyright to frustrate competition.265
The court in Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment,
however, acknowledged that copyright misuse “might operate beyond
its traditional anti-competition context” and could be asserted in situations where copyright owners attempt to use their copyright to restrict
critical speech.266 Specifically, the Video Pipeline court explained that
“[a] copyright holder’s attempt to restrict expression that is critical of
it (or of its copyrighted good, or the industry in which it operates, etc.)
may, in context, subvert . . . copyright’s policy goal to encourage the
creation and dissemination to the public of creative activity.”267 Similarly, in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the court considered
that copyright misuse could exist in situations other than antitrust or
restrictive licensing agreements and “could be applied to new situations as they arose.”268 Weaponizing copyright to suppress information and censor criticism is certainly using copyright “in a manner
violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”269
However, there is still uncertainty over how copyright misuse might
more broadly apply and what actions it actually could cover. As a fairly new concept, copyright misuse has not been recognized by the Supreme Court, and lower courts have generally “applied the doctrine
sparingly.”270 Furthermore, courts frequently limit the defense to application in limited anti-competitive situations.271
Anti-SLAPP laws are state laws allowing for early dismissal and
fee shifting to defendants facing certain meritless litigation. SLAPP
stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation,” and antiSLAPP laws are intended to “provide breathing space for free speech
264. Judge, supra note 2, at 902.
265. See Judge, supra note 2, at 903–04.
266. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir.
2003). See also Deepa Varadarajan, The Uses of IP Misuse, 68 EMORY L.J. 739, 761 (2019);
Olson, supra note 75, at 581.
267. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d at 205–06.
268. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 WL 8492716, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
9, 2011).
269. Id. (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990)).
270. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011).
271. See, e.g., Philips North Am., LLC v. Summit Imaging Inc., 2020 WL 6741966, at *8
(2020) (describing copyright misuse as a defense that “forbids a copyright holder from
securing an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office” and
prevents “copyright holders from using the conditions to stifle competition”) (internal quotations omitted). See also, Xiyin Tang, Can Copyright Holders Do Harm to Their Own
Works?, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1245, 1278–79 (2021) (acknowledging courts’ limited
application of the copyright misuse doctrine to antitrust violations, but discussing cases in
which the concept of copyright misuse being applied in cases where copyright owners use
copyright to regulate extra-copyright interests, such as Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 304–06 (2d Cir. 1966)).
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on contentious public issues.”272 Specifically, anti-SLAPP laws can
“decrease the ‘chilling effect’ of certain kinds of . . . speech-restrictive
litigation . . . by making it easier to dismiss . . . suits at an early stage
of the litigation.”273 California’s anti-SLAPP law, for instance, allows
defendants to strike any legal claims asserted against a defendant for
“exercis[ing] [their] constitutional right of petition or [their] constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest.”274 State anti-SLAPP laws, however, do not apply
to federal causes of action, such as copyright infringement claims.275
Furthermore, several courts have ruled that state anti-SLAPP laws are
inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because they require a plaintiff to make a showing higher than is required by the federal rules for their claim to survive to trial.276 Finally, with the
exception of California and a few other states, state anti-SLAPP laws
have narrowly focused on preventing suits arising from a party’s exercise of its right to petition.277 Therefore, state anti-SLAPP laws do
not create any practical or legal hurdles to copyright weaponization.278
All of the reasons above combine to make copyright a superior
weapon to wield to achieve personal objectives such as silencing and
suppressing content, erasing and burying information, punishing and
retaliating against perceived wrongdoings, protecting reputation and
moral rights, and preserving privacy. But these reasons alone would
not be enough to cause the widespread weaponization of copyright
that we are seeing today. In addition to the benefits of using copyright, many individuals also turn to copyright to fill gaps in other areas of the law, including privacy, moral rights, and false endorsement.
B. Copyright as Legal Gap Filler
In addition to the benefits of weaponizing copyright,279 another
reason for the widespread weaponization of copyright is the existence
of gaps and limitations in other areas of the law. “The law often

272. La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y
Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
273. Id. (quoting EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES
118 (5th ed. 2014)).
274. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e) (1971).
275. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010).
276. See, e.g., La Liberte, 966 F.3d 79; Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d
1345, 1350–57 (11th Cir. 2018); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019).
277. See Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, #AINTTURNINGTHEOTHERCHEEK:
Using Anti-SLAPP Law as a Defense in Social Media, 87 UMKC L. REV. 801, 806–07
(2019).
278. There is currently no federal anti-SLAPP statute.
279. Infra Section IV.B.
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moves to fill a gap.”280 This statement is certainly true in the areas of
privacy law, moral rights law, and laws preventing false endorsement
and false association. Because of the gaps and limitations in these
other areas of the law, copyright rises above as a superior remedy to
prevent dissemination of private or intimate information, to prevent
tarnishment or false association of copyright works, and to protect the
reputation of creators and copyright owners by rejecting perceptions
of endorsement or association.
1. Copyright Is Better than Privacy Laws at Protecting Privacy
It would appear that privacy laws or even criminal laws should be
more fitting than copyright law to preserve privacy and prevent the
nonconsensual dissemination of intimate content. However, these legal solutions have proven to be far less efficient than copyright law
for protecting individuals’ privacy. As a preliminary manner, the
United States does not have a structured or protective privacy regime.281 Privacy laws are inconsistent and state-specific, and state
statutory protection “is generally scattershot and focused on specific
areas, such as medical information, banking data, data held by the
federal government and the like.”282
Privacy claims are also limited by First Amendment considerations.283 A case described in Part II, Hill v. Public Advocate, is useful
to illustrate the First Amendment scrutiny of privacy claims compared
to copyright claims.284 In that case, as described above, Public Advocate used the engagement photograph that Katrina Hill took of samesex couple Brian Edwards and Thomas Privitere in a political campaign against same-sex marriage.285 In addition to the copyright infringement claim Hill asserted against Public Advocate for its
unauthorized use of her photo, Edwards and Privitere also asserted a
claim against Public Advocate for appropriation of name or likeness, a
privacy tort under Colorado law.286 The court, however, dismissed
Edwards and Privitere’s claim for privacy violations because Public
280. McKeown, supra note 229, at 14.
281. See McKeown, supra note 229, at 14.
282. McKeown, supra note 229, at 15.
283. See, e.g., Lauren Frias, Ex-Rep. Katie Hill Loses Lawsuit Against Daily Mail for
Publishing Nude Photos of Her, Accuses Judge of Thinking ‘Revenge Porn’ Is Free Speech,
INSIDER (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/katie-hill-lawsuit-daily-mailnude-photos-2021-4 [https://perma.cc/LNP6-H7VX] (discussing a court’s dismissal of
Hill’s claim against the Daily Mail on anti-SLAPP grounds because Daily Mail’s publication of intimate photographs of Hill were “a matter of public issue or public interest” and
did not violate California’s revenge-porn law).
284. Hill v. Pub. Advoc. of the U.S., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014).
285. Id. at 1351–52.
286. Id. at 1355.
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Advocate’s unauthorized use “relate[d] to a legitimate matter of public concern” and was therefore immunized under the First Amendment.287 Hill’s claim for copyright infringement, on the other hand,
survived Public Advocate’s motion to dismiss.288 The parties settled
shortly afterward.289
Section 230 also immunizes Internet platforms from personal privacy claims. Thus, privacy laws do not provide individuals with the
immediate relief of removing private and personal content from the
Internet. Because copyright infringement is an exception to Section 230’s immunity for content platforms, content platforms are motivated to quickly remove online content accused of infringing
copyright.290 On the other hand, platforms are generally immunized
from personal privacy claims and other tort claims by Section 230.291
This means that content platforms may not be as pressured to remove
user-generated content that violates a person’s privacy as they would
be to remove the same user-generated content if it infringes copyright.292 As Professor Danielle Citron explained, this “give[s] content
platforms a free pass to ignore destructive sexual-privacy invasions, to
repost illegal material knowingly and deliberately, and to solicit sexual privacy invasions while ensuring that abusers cannot be identified.”293 For instance, both Professor Citron and Professor Andrew
Gilden have described an instance on the dating app Grindr where a
man, Gutierrez, set up an imposter profile for his ex-partner, Matthew
Herrick. Gutierrez posted Herrick’s nude photographs on Grindr,
claimed that Herrick fantasized about being raped, and shared Her287. Id. at 1357.
288. See id. at 1360. See also Deidré A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 34 (2016) (“[C]opyright infringement
allegations are more likely to hold up for a plaintiff than are right to privacy or right of
publicity claims. This helps to explain why one seeking to stop the dissemination of a particular work might opt to proceed under copyright in addition to any extant privacy causes
of action.”).
289. Caitlin Gibson, Case Against Advocacy Group Tied to Loudoun County Supervisor
Ends in Settlement, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/virginia-politics/case-against-advocacy-group-tied-to-loudoun-county-supervisorends-in-settlement/2014/06/19/e6ea1b1e-f7cc-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html
[https://perma.cc/G6SK-K8PU].
290. See supra Section III.A.4. See also Gilden, supra note 7, at 104 (“The IP exception
to CDA immunities has the benefit of forcing intermediaries to respond to specific claims of
harm by their users without eliminating the general flexibility to balance safety and privacy
that the CDA otherwise provides.”).
291. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2019).
292. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 942 (under Section 230, “online publishers, virtually without exception, are not liable for privacy violations or reputational injuries attributable to content provided by third parties and are not obligated to remove content in
response to complaints or legal threats”).
293. Citron, supra note 188, at 1943; see also Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 2025, 2029–30 (2014).
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rick’s home address.294 Herrick notified and complained to Grindr
over fifty times, but Grindr ignored his complaints and refused to remove the imposter dating profile.295 Herrick finally sued Grindr asserting a variety of tort claims as well as a copyright claim for
displaying nude photographs that he had taken of himself.296 The
court dismissed the Herrick’s tort claims based on Grindr’s immunity
under Section 230, but permitted Herrick to amend his copyright
claim against Grindr.297 Unlike privacy or other tort laws, copyright
provides a much more effective solution to remove nonconsensual
personal or intimate content online.298
Finally, even though more than half of the states have enacted
laws criminalizing revenge porn, reliance on criminal law can be
complicated. First, relying on criminal law requires garnering sympathy from law enforcement and relying on law enforcement to take
action.299 As Professor Gilden explained, law enforcement may not
understand certain sexual contexts or sexual minority communities,
and could be hostile or unhelpful in contexts that they do not understand.300 Furthermore, according to Professor Mary Anne Franks and
Professor Citron, law enforcement may not take victims of revenge
porn seriously, and can sometimes blame or shame victims for appearing in these sexual images or videos.301 These prejudices can especial-

294. See Citron, supra note 188, at 1943.
295. Id. at 1943–44.
296. Gilden, supra note 7, at 87.
297. Id.
298. See Tehranian, supra note 234, at 359 (“[L]ong-established First Amendment principles make invasion of privacy claims against internet entities who simply further the recording’s distribution far more difficult to sustain . . . .”). Additionally, unlike the European
Union, the U.S. has not adopted Federal legislation recognizing a “right to be forgotten.”
See Lisa Vaas, Google Wins Landmark Case: Right to be Forgotten Only Applies in EU,
NAKED SEC. BY SOPHOS (Sept. 25, 2009), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/
2019/09/25/google-wins-landmark-case-right-to-be-forgotten-only-applies-in-eu/
[https://perma.cc/S5D9-6VH7]. Because of these gaps, some Internet service providers have
created policies to help victims of nonconsensual pornography remove their private content
online. See Remove Non-Consensual Explicit or Intimate Personal Images from Google,
GOOGLE
SEARCH
HELP,
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/6302812
[https://perma.cc/4HAJ-MG94] (providing a process for removing revenge porn if “[t]he
imagery shows you . . . nude, in a sexual act, or an intimate state . . . [and y]ou . . . didn’t
consent to the imagery or the act and it was made publicly available [or] you intended the
content to be private and the imagery was made publicly available without your consent”).
But these are policy choices by private companies that are not based on underlying privacy
or tort laws.
299. See Gilden, supra note 7, 101.
300. See id.
301. See Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 226 (2011); Citron & Franks, supra note 179, at
366–67.
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ly affect women and sexual minorities.302 Unlike state criminal laws,
copyright law empowers victims of nonconsensual pornography to
control the removal of their intimate images online, rather than relying
on the mercies of law enforcement. Additionally, while violations of
federal criminal law are exempt from Section 230’s immunity, Section 230 appears to “trump[] any state criminal law,” and “[a] lot of
[content platform] companies are under the impression they can’t be
touched by state criminal laws.”303 This means that content platforms
may not be as motivated to expeditiously remove images that violate
state criminal nonconsensual pornography laws as they are with removing images that infringe copyright. This leads copyright owners to
weaponize copyright to fill privacy gaps to more efficiently and effectively protect their private information and prevent dissemination of
intimate images.
2. Copyright Is Better than Moral Rights Laws at Protecting Moral
Rights and Reputation
Copyright owners weaponize copyright to assert control and protect a copyright owner’s personal reputation, protect moral rights in
their works, and prevent works from becoming associated with disparaging or tarnishing uses. While it seems that copyright ownership
and its attendant rights should protect these interests, these are traditionally considered personal rather than economic interests, and do
not fit the standard story that has frequently justified copyright protection.304
Outside of copyright law, U.S. law provides little solution for
copyright owners to prevent unauthorized uses of their works that
damage their reputation, tarnish or associate their works with degrading ideas, or harm their authorial dignity in their works. This is especially true online, where “[a]nyone who releases cultural artifacts into
a digital network — whether via text message, cloud storage, or Facebook — risks that artifact being used by others in ways that reshape
their work, family, and romantic relationships and limit their ability to
302. See Tehranian, supra note 234, at 362–63 (“The historical double-standard on, sexual promiscuity and the prevalence of practices such as slut-shaming mean that the impact on
a young woman who finds her naked body trending on Twitter may be quite different than
that on a similarly-situated young man.”); Gilden, supra note 7, at 101 (“LGBT activists
should be cautious of inviting law enforcement into spaces where naked images are shared
regularly, as it may be difficult for state actors to distinguish . . . unconscionable activities . . . from other forms of sexual image-sharing that fall within the community’s norms.”).
303. Josh Blackman, Federal “Revenge Porn” Legislation in the Works, JOSH
BLACKMAN (Nov. 25, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/11/25/federal-revengeporn-legislation-in-the-works/ [https://perma.cc/BMY3-ZGX9].
304. See McKeown, supra note 229, at 7–8; Balganesh, supra note 7, at 21 n.65 (surveying scholarship critical of using copyright to protect dignitary or privacy interests).
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set the terms of their own cultural participation.”305 Copyright owners
in these situations can suffer legitimate injuries separate from economic injuries to their copyrighted works.306 When those works are
used in ways that are especially offensive to copyright owners, owners
choose to weaponize copyright because they are unable to rely on other legal solutions. For instance, in the dispute between Griner and
King over King’s unauthorized use of Griner’s photograph of her son,
Griner explained that she “would never attach [her son’s] face willingly to any negative ad . . . . [B]igotry is just the antithesis of what
we want to be the association with [Success Kid].”307 Griner eventually filed a copyright infringement claim against King, his campaign,
and the Republican fundraising site WinRed for their unauthorized
use of Success Kid in order to ensure that her photograph is not used
by a politician who Griner described as “just the worst of the
worst.”308 Griner’s use of copyright in this instance appears to be to
protect her reputation and to prevent her work from being tarnished or
associated with bigotry and hate.
Moral rights protect noneconomic rights a creator retains in their
work, including the creator’s right to protect the integrity of their
work from distortions that could damage the creator’s honor or reputation.309 Moral rights originated in Europe, and in some European
countries, moral rights grant creators the right of attribution, the right
of disclosure and withdrawal, the right of integrity, and, in certain
instances, the right to have access to the original work, to compel the
completion of a work, or to prevent their work from being associated
with undesirable products or institutions.310 In the United States, the
Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”) is the only federal law that explicitly protects the moral rights of creators,311 and VARA is significantly narrower than moral rights legislation in European countries.312
VARA only grants creators the right to attribution and the right to
integrity, including the right to prevent the destruction of works of

305. Gilden, supra note 7, at 109.
306. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 1, at 2480–81 (describing a view opposing
the economic consequentialist theory for copyright).
307. Yuhas, supra note 168.
308. Id.
309. Cathay Y. N. Smith, Creative Destruction: Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine and the
Moral Right of Integrity, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 608 (2020).
310. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY:
EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 13–14 (2019); Smith, supra note 309,
at 608.
311. See generally id. at 40–107 (discussing VARA and other federal laws that could
protect moral rights, including Misappropriation and Unfair Competition under the Lanham
Act, Section 1202 of Title 17, and other Title 17 Provisions).
312. Smith, supra note 309, at 614 n.91.
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recognized stature.313 Furthermore, VARA only applies to a narrowly
defined “work of visual art.”314 A work of visual art is a painting,
drawing, print, sculpture, or still photograph image produced for exhibition purposes “existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer.”315 It does not include music or literary works, and
does not apply to reproductions of a work of visual art.316 Therefore,
neither Griner’s Success Kid meme, nor any of the purportedly infringed works described in Part II of this Article, would likely meet
the definition of a work of visual art to be protected under VARA.
Therefore, even if any of the infringing uses described in Part II could
violate a creator’s moral right of integrity by distorting, mutilating, or
modifying a work to prejudice the creator’s honor or reputation,317
creators would not have a cause of action under VARA. VARA rights
are also subject to copyright’s fair use defense.318
Not being eligible to assert a moral rights claim, some copyright
owners have tried, but failed, to assert a false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act based on unauthorized uses of their copyrighted
works.319 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a cause of action
for false association against “the use of false designations of origin,
false descriptions, and false representation in the advertising and sale
of goods and services.”320 Courts frequently reject false endorsement
claims that are based solely on the use of another’s copyrighted
work.321 Copyright owners, therefore, instead assert copyright to raise
“what is essentially a trademark-related claim — in other words, they
use their ability to control the exploitation of the work to challenge
uses that suggest an authorization or sponsorship of the message conveyed by the defendant’s use.”322 In Henley v. DeVore, Don Henley
asserted a Lanham Act false endorsement claim and copyright infringement claim against politician Charles DeVore for his unauthorized use of Henley’s songs, “The Boys of Summer” (“Summer”) and
313. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
314. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
315. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of a “work of visual art”).
316. See id.
317. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
318. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (“Subject to section 107 . . .”).
319. See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1166–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010);
Nichols v. Club for Growth Action, 235 F. Supp. 3d 289, 297–98 (D.D.C. 2017); Oliveira v.
Frito Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp.
2d 1073, 1080–81 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (refusing to dismiss Jackson Browne’s Lanham Act
claims against John McCain for McCain’s unauthorized use of Browne’s music at a campaign rally).
320. See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
321. See supra note 319 (collecting cases).
322. Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52
B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1402 (2011).
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“All She Wants to Do is Dance.”323 Summer, written by Henley, described nostalgia for a past summer romance.324 The iconic song began, “Nobody on the road / Nobody on the beach / I feel it in the air /
The summer’s out of reach / Empty lake, empty streets / The sun goes
down alone / I’m driving by your house / Though I know you’re not
home . . . .”325 DeVore, a California assemblyman who was seeking
the Republican nomination for senate, incorporated Summer into a
campaign video criticizing Obama, Nancy Pelosi, and Obama’s supporters.326 DeVore rewrote the lyrics from Summer to create and record “The Hope of November” (“November”) using the music from
Summer.327 The lyrics for November began, “Obama overload /
Obama overreach / We feel it everywhere / Trillions in the breach /
Empty bank, empty street / Dollar goes down alone / Pelosi’s in the
House / So we now all must atone . . . .”328 Henley argued that DeVore’s use of his iconic songs falsely suggested that Henley endorsed
DeVore and his political campaign.329 The court dismissed Henley’s
false endorsement claim, finding that Henley could not maintain a
Lanham Act claim based purely on the use of his songs.330 Based on
the same facts, however, the court granted Henley’s summary judgment on his copyright infringement claim, finding that DeVore’s unauthorized uses of Henley’s songs infringed Henley’s copyright.331
This case is an example of how copyright owners succeed in weaponizing copyright to protect their reputational interests that may not be
protected by other laws, such as the Lanham Act.
Finally, while trademark law allows an owner to sue for the dilution by tarnishment of a trademark, there is no similar cause of action
for tarnishment of a copyright. Therefore, copyright owners weaponize copyright to protect their works from tarnishment from unsavory
323. See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1147, 1149.
324. Id. at 1147.
325. Id. at 1169 App. A.
326. Id. at 1148.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1169 App. A.
329. Id. at 1147, 1149.
330. Id. at 1166–68. The Henley court relied on Oliveira v. Frito Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56
(2d Cir. 2001). In Oliveira, Astrud Oliveira sued Frito Lay for using her 1964 song recording of The Girl from Ipanema in Frito-Lay’s television advertisement for Baked Lay’s Potato Crisps. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 57–58. Based on the fame of her recording, Oliveira claimed
to have earned trademark rights in that recording, and that the public recognized it as designating her as a singer. Id. at 59. Similar to Henley, the Oliveira court did not agree that a
performer could hold a trademark in her own musical performance. Id. at 62; Henley, 733 F.
Supp. 2d at 1167. But dissimilar to Henley, Oliveira did not hold the copyright in the recording of her musical performance, and ultimately lost her case against Frito Lay. Oliveira,
251 F.3d at 58, 63.
331. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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or degrading uses.332 Matt Furie’s lawsuit against Infowars and other
unauthorized racist uses of Pepe the Frog is an example of a copyright
owner weaponizing copyright to prevent the tarnishment and disparaging association of his copyrighted work.333 Pepe the Frog is perhaps
the most notorious example of an expressive work that was appropriated as a meme and deliberately tarnished and radicalized by white
supremacists and the alt-right. Furie asserted copyright against altright and other racist uses of Pepe to prevent the further tarnishment
of Pepe the Frog and stop its association with racism and hate.334 Under trademark law, trademark owners can assert a claim for trademark
dilution by tarnishment if a defendant uses the mark on unwholesome,
disparaging, or inferior services “that may create a negative association with the goods or services covered by the famous mark.”335 The
racist and hateful uses of Pepe the Frog certainly tarnished Furie’s
expressive work, to the point where it risked becoming more associated with white supremacy and anti-Semitism than its original meaning.336 Nevertheless, there is no claim for dilution by tarnishment of
copyrighted works,337 and Furie’s best choice to save Pepe was to
weaponize copyright against these hateful uses of his work.
Several factors contribute to copyright’s function as a weapon par
excellence for copyright owners to achieve noncopyright objectives.
One of those factors is the gaps or limitations in our legal system that
do not effectively protect privacy interests, reputational interests,
moral rights, or dignitary interests in copyrighted works. In the instances described above, it appears that copyright has moved in to fill
the gaps left by privacy and other laws, and created a more efficient
way to protect those personal interests. Other factors that contribute to
the increase in copyright weaponization are the limited First Amendment scrutiny afforded to copyright claims, the DMCA’s powerful
extrajudicial regime, and the very few legal hurdles placed in the way
of copyright weaponization. All of these factors together make copy332. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 1, at 2469 (“[C]oncern for sacredness and
defilement are commonplace in copyright disputes.”).
333. See Frye, supra note 147, at 20:45–30:00, 26:40–27:00.
334. Id.
335. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 614 (E.D. Va. 1997).
336. See
Pepe
the
Frog,
General
Hate
Symbols,
ADL,
https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/pepe-the-frog
[https://perma.cc/BM5P-L6SF]; Mele, supra note 153.
337. To be clear, I am not arguing here that there should be a dilution by tarnishment
cause of action for copyright. There are criticisms of the Lanham Act’s trademark dilution
provisions, and those identified problems and critiques would likely extend to the creation
of any form of copyright dilution by tarnishment cause of action. See generally Rebecca
Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 507 (2008).
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right an attractive solution to achieve the many noncopyright objections described in this Article.

IV. WHAT TO DO ABOUT COPYRIGHT WEAPONIZATION?
As detailed in Part II of this Article, copyright owners weaponize
copyright to silence and erase facts, suppress criticism and critical
speech, punish and retaliate, protect moral rights and reputation, and
preserve privacy. Part III explained why copyright owners choose to
weaponize copyright instead of relying on other legal solutions to
achieve their objectives. As detailed in that Part, weaponizing copyright offers many benefits to copyright owners that other legal solutions do not. This Part explores the different proposals on handling
copyright weaponization.
There are three main approaches to handling copyright weaponization. One approach is to reject all uses of copyright to protect noneconomic interests, including personal interests. A second approach is
to accept copyright’s ability to protect important privacy interests, but
to reject all other noncopyright uses of copyright. The third approach
is to recognize copyright’s use for multiple purposes, including to
protect personal interests such as privacy, reputation, and dignity and
moral rights in copyrighted works. This Part explains each of these
approaches, critically examines the benefits and concerns of each one,
and assesses whether there is a fair and just way to handle the increasingly widespread practice of copyright weaponization.
A. Reject Copyright Weaponization
There are strong reasons to limit copyright to protecting economic
interests in copyrighted works. Copyright is justified though the utilitarian theory which posits that creators will create works based on
copyright law’s promise of market exclusivity.338 Therefore, because
the very existence of copyright is justified by this market rationale,
this approach would support the notion that copyright owners should
only assert their copyright when their market exclusivity is threatened.
Limiting copyright assertions to only instances where a copyright
owner’s objective is to protect economic interests in their copyrighted
works may also be the cleanest and clearest rule to limit censorial uses
of copyright that impede speech or limit dissemination of information.
Rejecting any uses of copyright to protect personal interests such as
privacy, reputation, moral rights, or dignitary interests would further
338. See Balganesh, supra note 7, at 8 (explaining the generally accepted market rationale theory of copyright).
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copyright’s goal of disseminating information. There is strong support
for this approach.339
For instance, Judge Margaret McKeown rejects assertions of copyright that are incompatible with copyright and its function as the engine of free expression, including using copyright to protect
privacy.340 While sympathetic to copyright owners with limited legal
solutions to protect their privacy or prevent dissemination of intimate
information, McKeown maintains that “copyright cannot be everything to everybody. Our legal system . . . protects the expression of
ideas. No matter how noble and important the values of privacy and
protection of reputation, copyright is not the direct vehicle for their
vindication.”341 Specifically, McKeown emphasizes that “the protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law,”342 and “a
trumped up copyright claim” invoked to remedy personal harms, rather than economic harms, “cannot justify censorship in the guise of
authorship.”343
Similarly, Professors Christopher Buccafusco and David Fagundes advocate for policing of “the role of non-incentive-based objections to unauthorized use” of copyrighted works, and reject
copyright asserted against “unauthorized uses of . . . works that are
entirely divorced from reasons for [their] creat[ion].”344 For instance,
responding to concerns about unauthorized uses of copyrighted works
tarnishing or degrading those works, they hold firm that “[e]x post
anxieties about uses that tarnish or degrade a work or that upset the
author’s sense of fairness should not be remedied by copyright
law.”345 Instead, copyright should only support a copyright owner if
the unauthorized use of their work would undermine their desire to
create new works.346 Buccafusco and Fagundes support their argument by noting the high cost but low reward to the public when copyright owners use copyright to protect personal rather than economic

339. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 288, at 36–37 (“[E]ven if copyright can be contorted to
cover a case like the Ashley Madison case,” where copyright owners assert copyright in
order to remove personal information online, “perhaps it should not. This contortion has the
potential to create both doctrinal and practical problems, including . . . providing perverse
incentives to copyright owners.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1130 (1990) (“[C]opyright law is grotesquely inappropriate to protect privacy
and obviously was not fashioned to do so.”); McKeown, supra note 229, at 16.
340. McKeown, supra note 229, at 7–8.
341. Id. at 16.
342. Id. at 7 (citing Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003))).
343. Id. at 1.
344. Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 1, at 2484.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 2485.
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interests in their works.347 The public suffers a loss when work is removed from the public due to copyright. Where that copyright is used
to vindicate personal interests, but not to protect the owner’s creative
incentives, the public suffers a loss without benefitting from a corresponding gain.348 Because of this resulting imbalance, Buccafusco and
Fagundes maintain that “[w]hen there is no reason to think that the
defendant’s copy will substitute for the author’s work, there is no
threat to the author’s creative incentives, and thus, no need for copyright protection.”349
Professor Jeanne Fromer likewise highlights two problems when
copyright is used to protect noncopyright interests. First, copyright
was “designed with particular scenarios in mind, and [its] costs and
benefits are attuned to those scenarios.”350 Therefore, when copyright
owners weaponize copyright, they are asserting their copyright outside of those scenarios, which “can impose greater cost on society
than the intellectual property laws had anticipated without concomitant benefit.”351 Second, Fromer warns that in legal decisions involving copyright asserted to protect personal interests, courts are not
always explicit about whether the copyright owner’s personal motives
influenced the court’s ruling.352 For instance, there may be cases in
which a court takes into consideration the copyright owner’s noncopyright motives in granting the infringer’s fair use defense, or perhaps
takes into consideration the harm to a copyright owner’s reputational,
dignitary, or privacy interests in denying the infringer’s fair use defense. “In these instances, even if the particular judicial rule is sensible for the circumstances of the ill-fitting motivations, it might be a
poor rule to impose on plaintiffs with archetypical motivations.”353
These poor rules have the potential to distort copyright law and future
decisions by being applied to archetypical copyright cases “outside of
the contexts in which they were relevant.”354 Because of the distortions and harms that may be caused by copyright weaponization,
Fromer would limit copyright assertions “that do not bear on the reason for granting . . . copyright protection in the first place.”355
347. Id. at 2487.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 2441. But see Gordon, supra note 252, at 1634 (“Market failure should be
found only when the defendant can prove that the copyright owner would refuse to license
out of a desire unrelated to the goals of copyright — notably, a desire to keep certain information from the public.”).
350. Fromer, supra note 2, at 587.
351. Id. at 587.
352. Id. at 589.
353. Id. at 589.
354. Id. at 590.
355. Id. at 556–57.
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While there are solid reasons to reject weaponizing copyright to
achieve the noncopyright objectives described in Part II above, there
are also concerns with limiting copyright’s use only to protect economic interest of the copyrighted work. As a preliminary matter, it
can be difficult to accurately determine a copyright owner’s economic
versus noneconomic objective, especially where the copyright owner
may be motivated to achieve multiple objectives.356 One of those objectives could be to protect the economic interest and income stream
from their copyrighted work, while another could be to punish and
retaliate or to prevent the association of their works with people or
causes that they find morally repugnant.357 This creates difficulties
and uncertainty if any assertion of copyright is to be rejected when the
objectives sought are personal.
Another issue to consider is the narrow definition of “economic
interests” that copyright concerns. Specifically, copyright protects
copyright owners from economic harm from market substitution, not
economic harm from criticism that might decrease the demand for the
original work.358 Therefore, harm to privacy, safety, or reputation is
not harm in the copyright sense.359 At the same time, loss of privacy,
safety, and reputation could lead the copyright owner to suffer real
economic harm, even if that harm is not specific to the copyrighted
work itself. Unauthorized uses can also harm reputation of creators,
leading to the loss of future financial opportunities. For instance,
many people supposed Furie created Pepe the Frog in support of white
supremacy, which harmed his reputation and his ability to later sell
children’s graphic books.360 Similarly, in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation
LLC, the court recognized that the unauthorized use of a photograph:
may injure [the photographer] Kienitz’s long-range
commercial opportunities . . . . He promises his subjects that the photos will be licensed only for dignified uses. Fewer people will hire or cooperate with
Kienitz if they think that the high quality of his work
will make the photos more effective when used
against them!361
The plaintiff in Galvin v. Illinois Republican Party made a similar
argument that the defendant’s unauthorized political use of his photo356. See infra Part V.
357. Infra Part V.
358. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592–93 (1994).
359. McKeown, supra note 229, at 7.
360. See Frye, supra note 147, at 49:45–50:00.
361. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2014).
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graph “harm[ed] the reputation of [the photographer’s] subjects and
thus the value of his photographs.”362 The court in Galvin seemed
willing to recognize that “such ‘negative complements’ can impair a
plaintiff’s ‘long-range commercial opportunities’ even if a defendant’s unauthorized use does not reduce the value derived from the
plaintiff’s original work.”363 Sometimes, tarnishing uses of copyrighted works can also harm the indirect economic interests of the copyrighted work itself. For instance, once Pepe the Frog became an icon
of white supremacy and hate, Furie had trouble selling his original
Pepe the Frog merchandise.364 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was
clear that these are not the harms that copyright is meant to prevent:
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright
Act . . . . [T]he role of the courts is to distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it.365
Finally, one of the major concerns with limiting copyright use to
protect only economic interests is the loss of the only practical solution for individuals to protect their private information and intimate
images from dissemination.366 Because victims of nonconsensual pornography or forced disclosure of private information are often women
or sexual minorities, this approach could take away one of the more
effective weapons that these already vulnerable individuals have to

362. Galvin v. Ill. Republican Party, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
363. Id. at 1196.
364. FEELS GOOD MAN (Ready Fictions 2020).
365. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994) (internal quotation omitted); see also Gordon, supra note 252, at 1633 (“[W]hile criticism and the like may
indeed reduce an owner’s receipts, the goal of copyright is to generate incentives for the
production of works that satisfy consumer tastes. If a criticism reveals a work’s flaws, it is
appropriate that demand for the work should decrease.”)
366. See, e.g., Associated Press, U.K. Tabloid Must Run Front-Page Statement on Meghan Markle’s Legal Win, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021, 8:02 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2021-03-05/tabloid-run-front-pagestatement-meghan-markle-legal-win [https://perma.cc/9ZGW-X4GD] (explaining that British tabloid violated Markle’s privacy and infringed Markle’s copyright when it reproduced
large portions of a private letter that Markle wrote to her father, which her father provided to
the tabloids). But see Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and
Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 238 (2013) (“[C]oncern for the victims
of these reprehensible [revenge porn] sites is understandable, but distorting copyright law is
not the right solution.”).
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fight back and protect themselves from continued subjugation and
harms to their sexual autonomy.367
B. Accept Copyright Weaponization to Protect Privacy
There are strong arguments to allow copyright to not only protect
economic interests in copyrighted works, but also to be weaponized in
limited circumstances to protect privacy. Privacy is an important and
legitimate personal interest. As outlined above, because of various
limitations in privacy laws, copyright appears to be a superior solution
for individuals to protect their private information due both to its efficiency and effectiveness. This approach, endorsing copyright’s use to
protect privacy interests, enjoys strong support.368
As a preliminary matter, Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh challenges the commonly accepted understanding that traditional uses of
copyright were limited to protecting only economic interests in copyrighted works.369 He argues that privative copyright claims, or actions
brought to prevent dissemination of private and personal works, “are
almost as old as Anglo-American copyright law itself” and trace their
acceptance to early English law from the 1700s.370 These privative
copyright claims are asserted to protect personal rather than economic
interests in the copyright works, specifically, to protect copyright
owners’ privacy and dignitary interests. Balganesh argues for consideration for using copyright to protect the dissemination of private information in cases where the copyright owner is the creator, the work
has remained private, and the work is revelatory of the author’s identity.371 This would allow, for instance, nonconsensual pornography victims to assert copyright to prevent the dissemination of the intimate
images that they took of themselves,372 or Meghan Markle to assert
copyright against the tabloids that reproduced her private letter to her
father.373

367. See, e.g., Tehranian, supra note 234, at 362–64; Bambauer, supra note 293, at 2044
(“[Revenge porn] distribution risks worsening tenacious social mores that treat those who
engage in sex differently based upon gender, and it may cause victims to internalize those
norms.”); Gilden, supra note 7, at 82–84.
368. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 7, at 6–7; Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 943–
46; Bambauer, supra note 293, at 2048–49; Levendowski, supra note 10, at 439.
369. Balganesh, supra note 7, at 37.
370. Id. at 37, 40–41 (describing the earliest privative copyright case, Thompson v. Stanhope, where a court enjoined a widow’s publication of her late-husband’s letters where his
heirs argued that the letters’ publication would harm the late-husband’s reputation and honor).
371. See id. at 61–62.
372. See Fink, supra note 184.
373. See Associated Press, supra note 366.
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Similarly, Goldman and Silbey would permit copyright owners to
weaponize copyright in the limited circumstance where the goals of
copyright and privacy converge.374 This would involve asserting copyright to protect “never-disseminated works during the author’s lifetime, where unapproved dissemination, or even the threat of such
dissemination, can undermine the author’s intellectual freedom and
thus authorial productivity.”375 Goldman and Silbey consider and illustrate this limited circumstance in different forms of works where
copyright could align with privacy goals, including never- and limited-disseminated works, heirs and nostalgic remembrances, and photos and videos.376 In spite of the possibility of this limited
circumstance existing, they warn that “[i]n most instances . . . using
copyright to protect privacy produces untenable conflicts with fundamental rights, such as the right of free speech and the public interest
in science and self-government that free speech promotes.”377
Because of the limitations on privacy torts and other legal solutions to protect privacy,378 a few scholars specifically recognize the
benefit of allowing victims of nonconsensual pornography to weaponize copyright to defend themselves against public dissemination of
their intimate images. Professor Derek Bambauer, for instance, advocates for the use of copyright to address the problem of nonconsensual
pornography.379 He justifies his proposal to use copyright to combat
nonconsensual pornography with copyright’s traditional utilitarian
theory.380 Specifically, Bambauer argues that protecting intimate images from dissemination would incentivize the creation of those images, because creators would be able to rely on copyright to assert
control over how and when those images are used and shared.381 Professor Amanda Levendowski also supports using copyright to combat
revenge porn.382 Similar to Bambauer, Levendowski recognizes nonconsensual pornography as “a perfect example of the ways in which
374. Goldman & Silbey, supra note 7, at 989.
375. Id. at 989.
376. Id. at 970–88 (in each instance, while recognizing that sometimes it seems appropriate to provide copyright protection in limited circumstances, Goldman and Silbey find other
closely related circumstances where distorting copyright could undermine copyright’s social
balance).
377. Id. at 989.
378. See supra Section III.B.
379. Bambauer, supra note 293, at 2052.
380. Id. at 2031–32, 2039–42.
381. Id. at 2031–32, 2051–52 (“[T]he typical answer to non-consensual distribution is for
people to avoid creating intimate media in the first place. Thus, in the absence of a copyright-based approach . . . we will likely forgo the real and significant benefits that accrue to
partners who consensually employ these materials.”). See also Levendowski, supra note 10,
at 442.
382. See generally Levendowski, supra note 10.
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negative copyrights incentivize creation: those images would never
have been shared if victims did not believe they could control who
saw them.”383 Levendowski justifies the use of copyright to fight nonconsensual pornography based upon the gaps in legal solutions available to victims.384 Professor Ann Bartow similarly recognizes the
ability of victims of nonconsensual pornography to own copyright to
their intimate imagery in an effort to “use the notice and takedown
provision of the DMCA to try to reign in the online distribution of
works of revenge pornography.”385
Privacy is an important and legitimate interest that is not appropriately protected by current privacy laws, especially in the online
context. Therefore, it seems reasonable to allow copyright to fill the
gap in privacy laws and permit copyright owners to weaponize copyright to protect this important personal interest. There are, however,
concerns with this approach, as it could be both over- and underinclusive. Consider the Hill case where two private individuals’ engagement photo, capturing one of their happiest moments, was disseminated by a hate group to denigrate and disparage their very
union.386 In that instance, because the couple had first shared their
engagement photo online to celebrate their union, some of the approaches advocated in this section may not permit copyright to be
weaponized to prevent this violation of privacy. Therefore, limiting
this approach to works that have never been disseminated can be under-inclusive if the goal is to provide certain control over the dissemination of personal images and information.
On the other hand, this approach could also become overinclusive. As discussed below, there is a thin line between weaponizing copyright to protect privacy and weaponizing copyright to hide
information and erase history.387 Take, for instance, the dispute between Slade Neighbors and his ex-partner Veronica Monger.388
Neighbors clearly wanted to silence Monger and protect his reputation
by asserting copyright to wipe evidence of his abusive history. At the
same time, he was also motivated to protect his private text messages
and e-mails to his intimate partner. If copyright is weaponized to
broadly protect private information, Neighbors might be able to succeed in using copyright to silence Monger and suppress facts evincing
his abusive behavior. Similarly, Harvey Weinstein’s orchestrated attempt to silence his victims and suppress the content and publication
383. Id. at 442.
384. Id. at 428–37.
385. Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 45 (2012).
386. See supra Section II.E.
387. See infra Part V.
388. See supra Section III.A.2; infra Part V.
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of Ronan Farrow’s report389 could also be viewed as an attempt to
weaponize copyright to protect Weinstein’s privacy — even though
the information he attempted to keep private was his history of pressuring women for sex. Other examples include Monge v. Maya Magazines, involving a celebrity’s assertion of copyright to hide her secret
marriage,390 Four Navy SEALS v. Associated Press, involving military
members asserting copyright to prevent criticism of their behavior,391
and Jehovah’s Witnesses’ copyright suit against Faith Leaks to prevent dissemination of their yet-published religious videos.392 Advocating for copyright to be weaponized to protect privacy interests might
serve victims of nonconsensual pornography and victims of other
forms of forced disclosure of private information and allow them to
control the removal or dissemination of their personal content or images. However, it could also open the door for copyright owners to
claim protection of privacy interests when their ultimate goal is to
suppress unwelcomed speech and silence and erase information and
facts. As discussed further in Part V below, this approach can be particularly vulnerable to issues of “blurry lines and overlapping objectives.”393
C. Support Copyright Weaponization to Protect Personal Interests
While no proposed approach supports copyright owners who use
copyright to silence victims or suppress speech, several scholars do
accept the benefits of weaponizing copyright to protect personal interests, including privacy interests, and also interests implicating dignity,
autonomy, moral rights, and other emotional and cultural interests.
For instance, Professor John Tehranian recognizes an exception
for copyright owners who assert copyright to vindicate dignitary or
privacy interests.394 While Tehranian generally criticizes the use of
copyright for censorial purposes, including to suppress the dissemination of fact, he distinguishes copyright asserted to protect dignitary
interests from copyright asserted for censorial motives. The former
involves copyright owners who use copyright to prevent their highly
creative works “from unwanted derivation that undermine the integrity of the work.”395 The latter involves copyright owners who attempt
to limit the use of factual works.396 Tehranian might, for example,
389. See supra Section II.B.
390. See supra Section II.E.
391. See infra Part V.
392. See supra Section II.C.
393. See infra Part V.
394. See Tehranian, supra note 2, at 280–82.
395. Id. 280–82.
396. Id. 282.
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excuse musicians who assert copyright against unauthorized political
uses of their works by politicians such as Trump because the musicians “may not wish for their creative output to become associated
with causes that might undermine the perceived meaning of their
works.”397 Even though these musicians might also be motivated to
censor Trump, their “desire to suppress the . . . particular expression
may have served as an animating factor in the decision to file suit. But
it was not the primary motivator.”398 To Tehranian, this is distinguishable from copyright owners that assert copyright to censor “expression of basic facts or commentary on matters of public concern.”399
Professor Andrew Gilden acknowledges that “IP is doing work
that it was not intended to do. And this is ok.”400 He recognizes copyright’s ability to empower individuals to assert autonomy and control
over their life stories through “some degree of control over images,
sounds, and texts.”401 In that sense, copyright “becomes inseparable
from autonomy, self-definition, and identity development,”402 and
provides traditionally “marginalized groups . . . [a] discursive space
for their own meaningful cultural participation.”403 Gilden acknowledges that copyright law “may have been designed with a narrow set
of market-oriented concerns in mind,” but argues that it “can evolve
into a more capacious tool for managing boundaries in a social media
environment and addressing a broader set of concerns.”404 In fact,
Gilden proposes certain reforms to allow the law to “embrace[] a
more pluralistic notion of IP values,” including anonymizing copyright registrations with the U.S. Copyright Office to prevent private
information or intimate images from becoming part of the public record.405
Some scholars argue for even broader uses of copyright to prevent and remedy personal harms that unauthorized uses of copyrighted works may cause, such as harms to reputation, dignity, and moral
rights.406 Professor Madhavi Sunder, for instance, recognizes copyright “as more than a mere tool for incentivizing creativity,” but also
as a framework that “regulate[s] the cultural meanings and social rela397. See id. at 281.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 282.
400. Gilden, supra note 7, at 68.
401. Id. 106.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 107.
404. Id. at 110.
405. Id. at 112.
406. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United
States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 14 (2001); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “AuthorStories”: Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001).
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tions that flow from” cultural creations and artifacts, and as a “struggle over social relations.”407 Professor Margaret Chon maintains that
using copyright to protect certain privacy and other personal interests
“should not be categorically excluded as beyond the legitimate purview of copyright’s concerns,” affirming that “copyright will not be
stretched beyond its breaking point by incorporating” these personal
interests.408 While she focuses her arguments on asserting copyright to
protect privacy, especially its use against nonconsensual pornography,409 Chon more broadly describes how copyright and intellectual
property “operate[] within a larger frame of human flourishing.”410
She advocates for copyright to serve functions beyond just “promoting commercial activity,” but to also serve “in generating many other
social benefits and costs.”411 Professor Edward Lee makes a similar
argument for copyright to protect an author’s reputation or privacy
interests in situations where the author of the work asserts the copyright.412 Lee recognizes the interests of authors — not merely copyright owners — in copyrighted works:
Authors have legitimate privacy interests in their
works before first publication, which intersects with
their right not to speak under the First Amendment.
Authors also have valid reputational interests with
respect to their works that, in some cases, copyright
law may appropriately protect. Protecting these personal interests need not conflict with the utilitarian
goals of copyright law to incentivize authors to create works. Indeed, a reasonable regard for such interests in copyright law may help to fuel authors to
create more works as copyright law empowers them
to develop their name and reputation as authors, protected from unauthorized uses of their works constituting infringement.413
Copyright seems to lose some of its meaning if copyright owners
are not able to control or prevent even the most debasing uses of their
works. It would appear that copyright owners should have the right to
407. Sunder, supra note 5, at 274.
408. Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364,
366 (2016).
409. Id. at 366–67, 377–78.
410. Id. at 377.
411. Id. at 378.
412. Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379,
381–82 (2016).
413. Id. at 385.
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assert copyright to protect privacy, reputational, and dignitary interests by protecting their works from disparaging or demeaning uses.
There are, however, concerns with this approach. Copyright was not
created to protect these noneconomic interests and, as examined already in this Article,414 weaponizing copyright to protect these personal interests can distort copyright and its remedies, and impose
greater costs on society.415
Additionally, there may be no clear option to allow copyright to
protect interests such as privacy or dignitary interests without also
inadvertently permitting copyright to be weaponized to silence, suppress, and punish. This could permit copyright to threaten free speech,
rule of law, and the ability to combat disinformation, which can ultimately undermine the discovery of truth.
Furthermore, a strong justification for weaponizing copyright to
protect privacy, dignitary, and other personal interests is the limitations or gaps in other areas of the law.416 But should copyright law be
doing the job of filling the gaps in these other areas of the law? Copyright was not created to protect personal interests and is an imperfect
fit to remedy these personal harms. Could relying on copyright in fact
undermine privacy claims in certain contexts, including nonconsensual pornography, by diminishing the conceptualization of the harm in
these instances and making them reliant on ownership and proof? Furthermore, if we are content with copyright being used for purposes of
protecting privacy, reputational, or dignitary interests, could the law
become complacent in holding back important and necessary reforms
of laws, such as in the areas of privacy and others?
Regardless of whether copyright should be weaponized to protect
these personal noncopyright objectives, we know that it is being
weaponized to achieve the objectives discussed above. The practice is
widespread and likely more expansive than this Article can capture,
considering the many disputes that get quietly settled or content that
gets quickly taken down by content platforms. Some scholars are justifiably worried about the increasing ease with which copyright owners are able to weaponize copyright to achieve personal objectives,417
and others are understandably less concerned when those uses are to
protect equally important personal interests.418

414. See supra Part II.
415. See Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV.
2346, 2348 (2014); Fromer, supra note 7, at 587; Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 1, at
2436.
416. See supra Section III.B.
417. See supra Section IV.A.
418. See supra Section IV.C.
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However, any attempts to propose or decide a solution to reform
copyright weaponization is complicated by the blurry lines and overlapping objectives copyright owners might seek to achieve through
weaponizing copyright. In some instances, it may be apparent when
copyright is weaponized to achieve a noncopyright objective, but other cases can be less clear. As discussed in Part V below, the difficulties in accurately determining a copyright owner’s motivations for
weaponizing copyright complicates attempts to propose reforms to
solve copyright weaponization or to fully embrace any of the three
general approaches examined above.

V. BLURRY LINES AND OVERLAPPING OBJECTIVES
Without the ability to draw clean lines between objectives or to
firmly categorize objectives that are morally defensible from others
that we might find morally wrong,419 it is difficult to propose legal
frameworks that effectively distinguish between cases where weaponizing copyright should be condemned and cases where weaponizing
copyright might be excused or even justified.
As a preliminary matter, there may be instances when the utilitarian goals of privacy or dignity converge and overlap with copyright,420 such as in situations where the assertion of copyright to
protect privacy or moral rights incentivizes the copyright owner’s future creation due to their ability to control the use or dissemination of
their works.421 Some scholars have argued that the inability to control
the dissemination and sharing of intimate images could disincentivize
the creation of those images.422 For instance, if Hilary knew that she
would have no control over the dissemination of her intimate photographs and videos, she likely would not have created those photographs in the first place.423 Similarly, the ability to protect moral
rights in works could also incentivize further creativity.424 Artists such
419. See Rosenblatt, supra note 260, at 600 (“Law identifies some behaviors as admirable and others as shameful, and assigns legal value to some activities and not others.”).
420. See supra Section IV.B.; Goldman & Sibley, supra note 7, at 989.
421. See Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1763 (2012) (“[S]olicitude for, and sometimes protection of, creators’ moral-rights
interests can strengthen utilitarian incentives in copyright . . . law . . . .”); Levendowski,
supra note 10, at 442; Bambauer, supra note 293, at 2031–32, 2039–42. See generally
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010) (discussing the relationship between copyright law
and author creativity and moral rights).
422. See Lee, supra note 412, at 385; Levendowski, supra note 10, at 442; Bambauer,
supra note 293, at 2031–32, 2039–42. But see generally Tushnet, supra note 415.
423. See supra Section II.E.
424. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 70 (1985).
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as Furie or musicians may be more inclined to continue creating expressive works if they know they can rely on copyright to prevent
their works from being used to promote policies or ideologies that
they disagree with or morally oppose.425
Furthermore, it can be difficult to determine a copyright owner’s
objectives in asserting their copyright. Even though in some instances
it may be apparent when copyright is weaponized to achieve a
noncopyright objective, other cases can be less clear. Consider, for
instance, the dispute involving photographer William Greenblatt and
the iconic photograph he took of the gun-toting couple, Mark and Patricia McCloskey.426 The McCloskeys made headlines in June 2020
when they were photographed brandishing a rifle and pistol while
yelling at Black Lives Matter protesters marching through their
neighborhood in St. Louis.427 United Press International photographer
William Greenblatt shot a photograph of the McCloskeys holding
their guns.428 That photograph went viral and was shared widely by
news outlets and on social media.429 Greenblatt’s photograph of the
McCloskeys catapulted the couple into infamy.430 The McCloskeys
were invited to appear on Fox’s Tucker Carlson Tonight and Sean
Hannity to defend their actions.431 They also delivered remarks at the
2020 Republican National Convention in support of Donald Trump
and gun rights, and against the Black Lives Matter movement.432 A
few months later, the McCloskeys began handing out greeting cards
featuring a reproduction of Greenblatt’s photograph overlaid with the
caption: “Patty & Mark McCloskey v. The Mob June 28, 2020.”433 In
response, Greenblatt sent the McCloskeys a cease and desist letter
demanding $1,500 for their reproduction of his copyrighted photo.434
425. See supra Section II.D.
426. Michael Zhang, Gun-Toting Couple Billed by Photog for Using Viral Photo on
Greeting Cards, PETAPIXEL (Nov. 7, 2020), https://petapixel.com/2020/11/07/gun-totingcouple-billed-by-photog-for-using-viral-photo-on-greeting-cards/ [https://perma.cc/T7GUL5XS].
427. Jessica Lussenhop, Mark and Patricia McCloskey: What Really Went on in St. Louis
That Day?, BBC (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-53891184
[https://perma.cc/U5GK-HDE8].
428. Zhang, supra note 426.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Lussenhop, supra note 427.
432. Joan Greve, St Louis Couple Who Threatened Black Lives Matter Protesters Speak
at RNC, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/24/
st-louis-couple-rnc-mark-patricia-mccloskey [https://perma.cc/43QC-TDGN]; PBS NewsHour, WATCH: Mark and Patricia McCloskey Defend Right to Firearms | 2020 RNC Night
1, YOUTUBE (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIL4dft8VNw
[https://perma.cc/Z96M-ER2K].
433. Zhang, supra note 426.
434. Id. The McCloskeys sued Greenblatt and his publishers for trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Complaint at 6–11, McCloskey v.
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In this instance, what was Greenblatt’s objective in asserting copyright against the McCloskeys? In an interview, Greenblatt explained
that “[p]eople steal work all the time. They take it and feel that it’s
theirs. . . . It’s not even about the money. I could care less about the
money.”435 Does that mean that his assertion of copyright was to vindicate certain personal interests? To protect his reputation and prevent
his copyrighted photograph from being tarnished by the McCloskeys’
use? Perhaps Greenblatt wanted to punish the McCloskeys for their
unauthorized use or for smugly handing out greeting cards with
Greenblatt’s photo. Or perhaps Greenblatt wanted to suppress the
McCloskeys’ criticism and comparison of Black Lives Matter protesters to “the mob.” At the same time, Greenblatt also acknowledged that
his photograph of the McCloskeys that day was the most successful
and viral photograph that he had taken in his fifty years as a photographer.436 His cease and desist letter to the McCloskeys was also accompanied by a demand for $1,500.437 Even though Greenblatt said
that it was not about the money, perhaps Greenblatt was in fact motivated, at least in part, by missing out on the financial interests that he
could generate from his copyrighted photo. It is also possible that
Greenblatt was trying to achieve multiple objectives. This makes it
difficult to categorize Greenblatt’s objective(s) or even clearly identify his use of copyright as weaponizing copyright. The difficulty in
assessing a copyright owner’s objective, and the potential to incentivize creation of works by protecting noncopyright interests, complicate
calls to reject all noncopyright uses of copyright and to accept approaches that rely on being able to distinguish between economic and
non-economic objectives.438
Even in instances where it appears obvious that a copyright owner
is weaponizing copyright to achieve a noncopyright objective, the
owner may be motivated by more than one objective, or their primary
objective may overlap with other, secondary motivations. Some of the
objectives that individuals seek to achieve through weaponizing copyright, such as preserving sexual privacy, may appear more morally
defensible than others, such as silencing sexual assault victims. However, the lines between objectives can be blurry, and many of these
objectives themselves overlap. Someone who asserts copyright out of
spite to punish, such as Campo Santo’s copyright strike against
RedBubble, Inc., No. 2022-CC10261 (St. Louis Cir. Nov. 6,
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/stl-mccloskey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RPL2-U72P].
435. Zhang, supra note 426.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. See supra Section IV.A.
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PewDiePie, may also want to protect their own reputation by preventing the association of their works with a racist.439 A photographer like
Hill might sue Public Advocate to protect the privacy of her clients
from appearing in the hate group’s anti-gay campaign flier,440 but she
may also want to prevent the association of her work with a listed hate
group, or to protect her reputation as a photographer. Artists like Kapoor may assert copyright against organizations such as the NRA because they do not want their work associated with divisive
propaganda, but perhaps they also want to suppress commentary with
which they disagree, or to punish organizations like the NRA because
of their controversial politics.441
Take, for instance, the case involving Navy SEALs’ attempt to
remove photographs of themselves mistreating Iraqi prisoners. In
Four Navy SEALs v. Associated Press, the wife of a Navy SEAL uploaded to SmugMug a number of photographs that her husband had
taken at Camp Jenny Pozzi, a Navy SEAL facility in Iraq.442 A reporter for the Associated Press (“AP”), Seth Hettena, found those photos
online while writing a news article about U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi
prisoners.443 Hettena published his article along with the photos in
worldwide media outlets.444 The photos featured uniformed U.S. military personnel “mugging or grinning for the camera” next to detained
and hooded prisoners; showed them “sitting on, lying atop, or stepping on detainees, some of whom are hooded”; and showed a soldier
“pointing a firearm at a prisoner’s bloody head at point-blank
range.”445 Five Navy SEALs who appeared in and purportedly took
those photographs filed a copyright infringement claim against the AP
seeking to enjoin the AP from further dissemination of the photographs.446 It appears that the case ultimately settled with a stipulated
dismissal.447 The Navy SEALs’ assertion of copyright clearly was not
to protect their own exclusive right to disseminate the photos or their
lost financial interest in the photographs, but what was their objective? Was it to silence and erase evidence of their bad behavior? Was
it to suppress negative commentary about the behaviors depicted in
439. Robertson, supra note 18 (quoting tweet by Sean Vanaman (@vanaman): “[o]ur
game on his channel = endorsement”).
440. See supra Section II.E.
441. See supra Section II.D.
442. Four Navy SEALs v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141 (S.D. Cal.
2005).
443. Id. at 1141.
444. Id. at 1141–42; see also Tehranian, supra note 2, at 271–72.
445. Four Navy SEALs, 413 F. Supp. 2d. at 1141.
446. Id. at 1142.
447. See Stipulation for Dismissal at 2, Five Navy SEALs v. Associated Press, 413 F.
Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 05-cv-00555).
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the photograph? Perhaps it was to protect the privacy of the soldiers
featured in the photographs?
Overlapping motivations certainly make it difficult to accurately
categorize the objectives that copyright owners seek to achieve
through weaponizing copyright. It makes it difficult for policymakers
to accept any one of the approaches discussed above in Part IV, and
makes it nearly impossible to suggest one solution, such as stronger
copyright defenses or creation of a federal anti-SLAPP law, that might
discourage weaponization without unintentionally foreclosing the only viable option to individuals to protect their privacy or other noneconomic, but equally legitimate, personal interests. Consider another
example. In Neighbors v. Monger, successful attorney Slade Neighbors and his ex-partner Veronica Monger ended their allegedly abusive relationship.448 After the relationship ended, Monger created a
Me-Too blog “dedicated to women who have survived or are in abusive relationships, with powerful executive men.”449 On the blog,
Monger posted general information on sexual assault and victims of
domestic violence, including articles on how to develop a “safety
plan”; articles on Harvey Weinstein and celebrities talking about domestic abuse; and other resources and support for victims of domestic
violence.450 In addition to those resources, Monger posted her personal stories detailing Neighbors’s emotional and physical abuse of her
during their relationship.451 Included in her descriptions were photos
of herself with a bruised face, and screen captures of text messages
and reproductions of e-mails between her and Neighbors supporting
his “alleged physical and mental abuse.”452 In response, Neighbors
filed copyright applications with the U.S. Copyright Office to register
his text messages and e-mails that he sent to the ex453 — the same text
messages and e-mails that she had reproduced on her blog. Neighbors
then sued her for copyright infringement, seeking an injunction to
remove her blog and damages for her unauthorized reproduction, dis448. Complaint at 3, Slade Neighbors v. Veronica Monger, No. 20-cv-04146 (C.D. Cal.
May 6, 2020); Milord A. Keshishian, Using Copyright Law to Silence Alleged Abuse Victim? Fair Use Defense?, L.A. INTELL. PROP. TRADEMARK ATT’Y BLOG (May 7, 2020),
https://www.iptrademarkattorney.com/copyright-fair-use-defense-silence-criticism-newsreporting-victim-critic-infringement/ [https://perma.cc/VH8D-NDEP].
449. While Monger’s blog is no longer active, there are archived versions available on
Internet Archive. See, e.g., SLADE NEIGHBORS ATTORNEY #ME-TOO — JOURNEY GETTING
THRU
DOMESTIC
ABUSE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200528212119/
http://sladeneighborsattorneyme-too.com/ [https://perma.cc/D6US-9MYR].
450. Id.; Keshishian, supra note 448.
451. Keshishian, supra note 448.
452. Id.; SLADE NEIGHBORS ATTORNEY #ME-TOO, supra note 449.
453. Email 1 and 7 Other Unpublished Works, U.S. Copyright Registration No.
TXu002193010 (filed May 1, 2020); Text Message 1 and 8 Other Unpublished Works, U.S.
Copyright Registration No. TXu002192994 (filed May 1, 2020).
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tribution, and public display of his text messages and emails.454 While
the lawsuit was pending, the Me-Too blog and all materials on the
blog were removed.455 The case settled and was dismissed on September 30, 2021.456
Neighbors clearly asserted copyright to silence his ex-partner. At
the same time, when Neighbors created and sent his text messages and
e-mails to Monger, he likely expected that those messages and e-mails
would remain private. Perhaps Neighbors weaponized copyright not
just to silence or erase evidence of his abusive behavior, but also to
preserve his privacy. Consider, then, Harvey Weinstein’s assertion of
copyright against Ronan Farrow.457 Assuming Weinstein could have
articulated some form of copyright ownership over materials about his
sexual misconducts, Weinstein could also argue that he too was trying
to protect his private and intimate information from dissemination.
Compare those two instances with women who assert copyright to
protect their intimate photographs from dissemination.458 Is there any
way to draw a clear and clean line between Neighbors’s and Weinstein’s use of copyright from women who use copyright to shield
themselves from nonconsensual pornography? In these cases, there
obviously exists a difference in power dynamics between the parties.
One side involves two powerful men asserting copyright to silence
their victims and erase evidence of their abusive behaviors. The other
side involves vulnerable victims of revenge porn asserting copyright
as the only solution to remove intimate images from public dissemination and protect their privacy. However, is there any way to manage
copyright to allow it to be weaponized to discourage the powerful
from using it to cover-up and bully others, but not prevent it from filling key gaps in protecting privacy of the already vulnerable? If copyright owners should be permitted to assert copyright to protect
privacy, as discussed in one of the approaches above, could a court’s
copyright ruling in a case involving a sympathetic revenge porn victim be weaponized by bad actors like Neighbors or Weinstein, allow454. Complaint at 5–6, Slade Neighbors v. Veronica Monger, No. 20-cv-04146 (C.D.
Cal. May 6, 2020).
455. See
Inactive
Domain,
http://sladeneighborsattorneyme-too.com/
[https://perma.cc/CB9U-G66N?type=image];
Unreachable
Webpage,
http://www.sladeneighborsattorneyme-toodomesticeviolence.com/ (last visited Dec. 14,
2020). Monger’s blog is no longer accessible at either web address, but previous posts can
be accessed through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. SLADE NEIGHBORS
ATTORNEY #ME-TOO, supra note 449.
456. Text Entry Order, Slade Neighbors v. Veronica Monger, No. 20-cv-04146, Docket
No. 29 (Feb. 4, 2021); Order on Joint Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, id., Docket
No. 41 (Sept. 30, 2021).
457. See supra Section II.B.
458. See supra Section II.E.
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ing them to assert copyright to wipe evidence of their abusive behaviors?
Similarly, weaponizing copyright to protect reputation, dignity, or
moral rights in a work can also lead to the suppression of valuable
social commentary. Take, for instance, the dispute between Margaret
Mitchell’s estate and author Alice Randall over her parody book The
Wind Done Gone.459 Mitchell’s estate had the practice of requiring
any licensee of Gone With The Wind to “sign a pledge that says
[they] will under no circumstances write anything about miscegenation or homosexuality.”460 Randall’s parody book identified main
character Ashley Wilkes as gay and described Rhett Butler in a love
affair with Cynara, a slave.461 While Mitchell’s estate may find Randall’s treatment of the book disparaging, demeaning, and a violation
of moral rights, allowing Mitchell’s estate to weaponize copyright to
protect its personal interests would stifle legitimate commentary, criticism, and fair use of the copyrighted work. Similarly, in Wojnarowicz
v. American Family Association, artist David Wojnarowicz sued
American Family Association for copyright infringement for publishing a pamphlet featuring his art.462 The pamphlet’s purpose was to
solicit support to terminate public funding by the National Endowment for the Arts of artworks such as Wojnarowicz’s featured in the
pamphlet.463 Wojnarowicz was understandably upset at the unauthorized use of his art to advocate against a cause in which he believed.
However, allowing Wojnarowicz to weaponize copyright to stop this
use because it disparaged his work, harmed his authorial dignity, or
associated his work with a cause that he morally opposed would also
allow him to suppress legitimate criticism and dissemination of information of public interest.
The blurry lines and overlapping motivations behind copyright
assertions, and the difficulty in ascertaining copyright owners’ motivations, complicate the analysis and frustrate arguments supporting
any of the approaches discussed in Part IV above. Furthermore, based
on the reasons that copyright owners choose to weaponize copyright
instead of relying on other legal solutions, discussed in Part III above,
it is clear that any attempt to reform or fix these concerns must be
comprehensive. Reforms targeted only at punishing copyright owners
who weaponize copyright through anti-SLAPP laws, stronger copyright misuse defenses, or stricter applications of Section 512(f) or
459. See supra Section II.D.; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,
1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
460. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring).
461. Id. at 1270–71.
462. Wojnarowicz v. Am. Fam. Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 133–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
463. Id.
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DMCA notice and takedown processes could foreclose the alreadylimited options given to victims of privacy violations to shield and
protect their privacy and sexual autonomy. Privacy, reputation, and
other dignitary interests are legitimate interests that deserve consideration through some thoughtful and balanced legal framework. Reforms that punish copyright weaponization, therefore, need to be
concurrent with reforms that strengthen laws or fill gaps that individuals are currently weaponizing copyright to fill. At the same time, any
reform must also consider the blurry lines and overlapping objectives
that copyright owners often seek in weaponizing copyright. They
should take into account existing power imbalances of parties involved in weaponizing copyright, and should help rather than hinder
attempts to level the playing field between traditionally vulnerable
victims and the powerful. Reforms to solve copyright weaponization
that rely on drawing lines based upon moral intuitions alone, or attempts to limit or protect some but not all of the objectives described
above, will undoubtedly face concerns about not capturing enough
harmful and abusive behaviors or foreclosing copyright owners’ abilities to protect legitimate personal interests.

VI. CONCLUSION
“[Copyright] has infiltrated our lives so that we all exist in a field
of uses and infringements.”464 While this may benefit society in certain respects, it also creates opportunities for individuals to weaponize
copyright to silence, erase, suppress, censor, punish, protect, and
achieve other noncopyright objectives. Some of these objectives may
appear justified, such as asserting copyright to protect privacy or reputation. Other objectives may appear more harmful, such as asserting
copyright to punish and retaliate, silence information and facts, and
suppress legitimate criticism and speech. As examined in this Article,
however, copyright owners are frequently motivated to achieve multiple objectives through weaponizing copyright, and many of the objectives themselves overlap. This makes it difficult to suggest or create
reforms to discourage copyright owners from weaponizing copyright
to achieve certain objectives, without inadvertently foreclosing options for copyright owners to protect legitimate personal interests.
Due to the ease of wielding copyright as a weapon, and the limitations
and gaps in other legal solutions such as privacy and moral rights,
copyright is often the most effective and efficient solution for copy464. Rebecca Tushnet, WIPIP, Session 2.B. — Copyrights, REBECCA TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG (Feb. 12, 2021 6:32 PM), https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2021/02/wipip-session-2bcopyrights.html [https://perma.cc/3L3A-8L3N] (quoting Mark Lemley).
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right owners to protect privacy, reputation, authorial dignity, and
emotional and cultural interests. At the same time, and for similar reasons, copyright is also the weapon par excellence for the modern silencer, punisher, and eraser. Perhaps this Article tells a larger story of
the problem when too many things are copyrightable and too many
uses are infringing. But for now, the focus can be a narrower challenge to consider comprehensive approaches to discourage harmful
copyright weaponization without fully foreclosing options for the
most vulnerable in our society to fight back and protect their legitimate personal interests.

